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The Measure of a Justice:
Justice Scalia and the Faltering
of the Property Rights Movement
Within the Supreme Court
RICHARD J. LAZARUS*
Commentators generally evaluate Supreme Court Justices based on
their votes in individual cases, especially the consistency of their voting
records over time. Justices are also most closely identified by the
majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions that they author although,
ironically, the most significant of the three-the majority opinions-are
the least likely to reflect the actual views of the authoring Justice in all
respects. Majority opinions are formally dubbed "Opinions of the Court"
for a reason. The single Justice assigned responsibility for crafting the
majority opinion is not charged with simply detailing his or her own
personal views. Quite the opposite. The Justice instead has the far more
challenging job of crafting the views of a majority of the Justices. To do
so frequently requires that the author of the opinion for the Court shed
her own views on one or more aspects of the case. That is why it is a
classic mistake for an advocate before the Court to refer to a majority
opinion by a specific Justice as that Justice's opinion as though the
opinion expresses the Justice's own personal views. Advocates who do so
at oral argument run the risk of being immediately stopped short by the
* Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Supreme Court Institute, Georgetown University Law
Center. I would like to thank Kelly Falls, Georgetown University Law Center Class of 2007, for her
excellent research and editorial assistance, and Georgetown Law Students JR Drabick, Seth Northrop
(Class of 2006) and Abby DeShazo (Class of 2007), for their outstanding assistance in reviewing the
papers of Justice Blackmun. This Article has benefited greatly from comments received on earlier
drafts from John Echeverria, Tim Dowling, and Professors Peter Byrne, Tom Merrill, and Mark
Tushnet, and Dean Bill Treanor. I served as counsel of record or co-counsel for parties or amicus in
many of the regulatory takings cases discussed in this Article, including Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6o6
(2ooi); Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 520 U.S. 725 (x997); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (i994); Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. Ioo3 (I992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (198I);
and Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (I98O). The views expressed herein are mine alone and do
not necessarily represent those of my clients in any of those cases.
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very Justice whose name they invoked to curry favor, but who instead
admonishes the attorney that it was the Court's opinion.'
It is, moreover, the ability of a Justice to craft such a majority
opinion that is ultimately the most important and least understood of the
skills that distinguish between ordinary and truly extraordinary jurists.
The Justice who is able to do so is the one most likely to produce Court
opinions that, because of their persuasive force, promote the kind of
public respect ultimately necessary for the Court's authority. They are
the majority opinions also most likely to have staying power over time. A
Justice less skilled in the crafting of majority opinions, by contrast, is
more likely to lose the majority present at conference when the Justices
initially voted on the case, producing a splintering of the Court expressed
in a rash of separate concurring and partially dissenting opinions. The
upshot is that the Justice may have remained very true to her own deeply
held convictions, but at the expense of producing opinions of the Court
that announce rulings of law that meet the test of time.
The Court's October Term 2004, along with the publication of the
papers of Justice Harry Blackmun (The Blackmun Papers) in the spring
of 2004,2 provide an opportunity to assess the ability of one of the current
Justices to promote Court opinions in an area of law centrally important
to him. Justice Antonin Scalia's arrival on the Court twenty years ago in
September 1986 coincided with a major strategic effort by advocates of
stronger constitutional protections of property rights to enlist the
Supreme Court in support of their cause. While it is far from clear that
property rights protections had previously been one of Justice Scalia's
primary concerns, he quickly championed those interests on the Court
and, with the arrival of Justice Clarence Thomas only five years later, the
property rights movement had good reason to be optimistic. Justice
Scalia appeared to have the makings of a solid majority on the Court that
he could use to produce a series of rulings based on the Fifth
Amendment's Taking Clause that limited government's ability to
interfere with private property rights, especially in land and other natural
resources.
No such significant legal precedent favoring property rights,
however, has resulted. The property rights movement has instead
I. See CLERK OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, GUIDE TO COUNSEL IN CASES TO BE ARGUED
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 7 (October Term 2004) ("Do not refer to an
opinion of the Court by saying: 'In Justice O'Connor's opinion.' You should say: 'In the Court's
opinion, written by Justice O'Connor."').
2. The papers of Harry A. Blackmun, lawyer, judge, and Associate Justice of the United States
Supreme Court were given to the Library of Congress by Justice Blackmun in 1997, with the
understanding that they would not be made generally available to researchers at the Library of
Congress until five years after his death. The papers became available in March 2004. See Linda
Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at AI. The papers
are referred to hereinafter as "The Blackmun Papers."
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recently suffered several losses in the Supreme Court, culminating in
spring 2005 with substantial defeats in all three property cases then
before the Court.' While no single Justice is likely to be the primary
cause of such a legal trend over several decades, the Blackmun Papers
provide support for the proposition that Justice Scalia may well be partly
responsible for the property rights movement's surprising lack of success.
They reveal a Justice not only failing to craft majority opinions for the
Court with persuasive staying power, but one who instead repeatedly
alienated over time the individual Justices with whom he needed to forge
a stable, workable majority favoring constitutional protection of property
rights. His penchant for bright line per se tests4 favorable to takings
plaintiffs ultimately had no legs within the Court As applied to
regulatory takings, the resulting analytic framework proved both
incoherent and hard to square with any of the other competing themes of
judicial conservatism within the Court: originalism and federalism. And,
as applied to the other Justices, it prompted Scalia likewise to use a
bright-line approach in condemning those moderate and conservative
Justices on the Court who failed to follow his lead. Justice Scalia
steadfastly refused to embrace the kind of balancing approach favored by
potential allies, especially Justices Kennedy and O'Connor, and
therefore lost the opportunity to produce significant precedent that
might have aided property rights advocates far more than the narrowly
drawn per se rules that Scalia personally favored.
Justice Stevens, by contrast, appears to have succeeded against high
odds where Justice Scalia has not, resulting in a series of rulings more
favorable to government regulators in property rights cases. Once
seemingly relegated to the role of the iconoclastic separate dissenter,
with the arrival of Justice Scalia and then Justice Thomas, Justice Stevens
has become the most influential member of the Court in property rights
cases as he proved willing to embrace a more contextual analysis that he
once rejected and, unlike Scalia, to join with those on the Court whose
views he did not entirely share.
The purpose of this Article is to take the measure of Justice Scalia's
ability to produce significant opinions for the Court, rather than just for
himself, by focusing on the Court's property rights cases during the past
several decades. Much of the analysis will rely on the Blackmun Papers,
because they provide a virtual treasure trove of information revealing the
Court's deliberative process while Blackmun was on the Court from 1971
3. Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005); San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City and County
of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
4. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Cm. L. REV. 1175 (1989);
Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court 1991 Term Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
1o6 HARV. L. REV. 22, 65-66 (1992).
5. See infra Part III.
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to 1994. Almost all of this information, including Justice Blackmun's
handwritten notes on what each Justice said at the Court's private
deliberations and initial voting on the cases at conference, has never
before been revealed and analyzed.
The Article is divided into three Parts. Part I briefly describes the
scope, content, and organization of the Blackmun Papers. Part II
describes what happened behind the curtain in each of the many
property rights cases before the Court between I97I when Justice
Blackmun joined the Court and 1994 when he resigned. The discussion
covers the Court's regulatory takings precedent both immediately before
Justice Scalia joined the Court and during the time that Justices
Blackmun and Scalia served together on the Court. It includes a
discussion of what was at stake in each case, what the Justices said at
conference, how they initially voted, and then how the actual opinion of
the Court evolved prior to its final publication. Finally, Part III offers a
broader assessment of Justice Scalia's effectiveness in moving the Court's
jurisprudence in a direction favoring greater constitutional protection of
property rights. This final analysis extends in time beyond Blackmun's
tenure on the Court to include the property rights cases since decided by
the Court.
I. THE PAPERS OF JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN
Justice Harry A. Blackmun served on the Supreme Court from 1971
until 1994, leaving the bench soon after the Court announced its final
opinions in June 1994 for October Term 1993. During his entire life,
including his years on the Court, Justice Blackmun kept detailed records
and notes on all aspects of his personal and professional life. The Official
Library of Congress Register of the Blackmun Papers, which simply
describes in the most general terms the contents of the Papers, is itself
362 pages long.6 Not only did he maintain a diary and keep copies of
personal and professional correspondence and speeches,7 he kept an
amazing array of records of his life's activities: his "mechanical
drawings",8 and report cards and grades in high school,9 his "financial
papers" from 1925 to 1932," "dance cards" during his college days at
Harvard," and even his notebooks for each of his classes at Harvard Law
School.'" The Blackmun Papers, publicly available in the Library of
6. Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Harry A. Blackmun-A Register of his Papers in
the Library of Congress (2003) (prepared by Connie L. Cartledge with the assistance of others)
[hereinafter The Blackmun Papers Register].
7. Id. at 3-8.
8. See The Blackmun Papers Register, supra note 6, Container 7.
9. Id.
Io. See The Blackmun Papers Register, supra note 6, Container i.
ii. Id.
12. Id. at Containers 1-5.
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Congress as of March 2004, extend to 1,576 containers of meticulously
organized files.'3
For scholars interested in the work of the Supreme Court, the
Blackmun Papers relating to his years on the Court are extraordinary. 4
For each of the hundreds of cases heard by the Court on the merits
during Justice Blackmun's tenure, there are documents revealing of not
only the deliberations within his own chambers, but also the thinking of
the other Justices. Documents for each case heard on the merits include:
* Case docket sheets showing how every individual Justice
voted on every case at both the jurisdictional stage and on the
merits, and the subsequent assignments of opinion writing
within the Court;
* Memoranda at the jurisdictional stage written either by
Blackmun's own clerks or the clerks of other chambers
concerning whether the Court should grant review in a
specific case;
* Bench memoranda written by one of the Justice's clerks in
anticipation of oral argument in the case, summarizing the
briefs, discussing the merits, and proposing possible questions
to be posed at oral argument;
* Blackmun's pre-oral argument notes prepared by Justice
Blackmun himself (typically handwritten) immediately before
the oral argument, in which he would outline his initial
thinking about a case, his likely vote, and sometimes also his
prediction of how the Court as a whole might vote;
* Oral argument notes taken by the Justice during oral
argument, which included brief discussion of substantive
points made at argument, but also included references to the
age, law school, and distinct physical characteristics of each
advocate, along with a letter or numerical grade of the quality
of their advocacy;
* Conference notes taken by the Justice during the Court's
private conferences during the weeks of oral argument, when
the Justices would, without any other persons present, discuss
the cases together and cast their votes (Blackmun wrote down
what each Justice said during the conference as well as their
votes);
* Draft majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions prepared
within Blackmun's own chambers and by other chambers,
often with Blackmun's notations and comments on the drafts;
13. Sep The Bl, kmun Paoers Reeister. supra note 6.
14. New York Times reporter Linda Greenhouse, who received early access to the Blackmun
Papers, has published an outstanding book that considers what the papers reveal about Justice
Blackmun's evolution on the Court, especially as it relates to Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and his
longstanding personal relationship with Chief Justice Warren Burger. See LINDA GREENHOUSE,
BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN'S SUPREME COURT JOURNEY (2005).
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* Opinion clerk memoranda prepared by Justice Blackmun's
clerks for the Justice, commenting on the draft opinions of
other chambers and recommending their modification; and
* Opinion Justice Correspondence between Justices concerning
circulating draft opinions. In such correspondence, a Justice
typically notifies the Justice authoring the opinion of a
decision to "join" the opinion, to request changes in the draft
opinion, often as a condition of joining the opinion, or to
prepare a dissent or concurring opinion or to await the
preparation of a dissent or concurrence by another Justice.
All of this information is very revealing of the Court's deliberative
process, but no doubt the most remarkable are Justice Blackmun's notes
taken during the conference on what each Justice said. The conference is
the Court's most confidential proceeding. Only the Justices are in
attendance. No other Court personnel, including the Justices' own law
clerks, are allowed to attend. Justice Blackmun's notes, moreover,
purport to be verbatim quotes of what each of the other Justices said in
conference. (He did not, no doubt for logistical reasons, write down what
he said at conference.) Justice Blackmun wrote his conference notes in
his own distinct shorthand, which usually can be deciphered fairly
accurately with experience. But, for that same reason, and because this
Article relies heavily on Blackmun's conference notes, a caveat is
required. Although Blackmun proffered these notes as verbatim quotes
of what the other Justices said, 5 they remain his notes of what they said,
rather than an actual verbatim transcript by a disinterested professional
reporter or a mechanical device. There is, accordingly, an unavoidable
risk that Blackmun consciously or unconsciously filtered the statements
made by other members of the Court in a manner that distorts their
meaning.
Finally, a note regarding the reading of Justice Blackmun's Papers is
in order. Many of the papers are typed, including the vast majority of law
clerk memoranda to the Justice, correspondence between chambers, and
draft opinions. For these documents, there is rarely any ambiguity
concerning what the documents provide. But other papers, including
some of the most interesting ones, are handwritten by the Justice himself.
These include his notes in preparation for oral argument, notes taken
during oral argument, notes taken during the Court's private conference,
15. Former clerks of Justice Blackmun, including Beth Brinkman, Chai Feldblum, and Charles
Rothfeld, have each confirmed in conversations with me that the Justice presented these notes as a
verbatim account of what each of the other Justices said at conference.
16. Justice Blackmun would, according to former clerks, report back to his clerks what happened
at conference by using his notes to recount what each of the other Justices said, using different voices
for each of the Justices. Former Blackmun clerks further report that clerks from other chambers would
sometimes come speak with them to find out what their own Justice had said at conference, to assist
their own work.
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and notes taken on draft opinions and law clerk memoranda. Almost all
of these notes are taken in the Justice's own unique shorthand, which
abbreviates many words and truncates sentences. Some translation of his
shorthand is therefore necessary. But such translation is generally not
difficult as one gets familiar with his patterns of abbreviation.
For instance, in describing what Justice Brennan said at conference
during the Court's deliberations in Penn Central Transportation Co. v.
City of New York,'7 Justice Blackmun wrote "Inquire on + partic fax,"
which means simply "Inquiry into the particular facts," no doubt
referring to the need for a court evaluating a takings claim to inquire into
the particular facts of a case.'8 Other examples are Blackmun's notations
regarding what then-Justice Rehnquist stated at that same Penn Central
conference. On the left is what Blackmun wrote and on the right is my
translation:'9
ED 5 Am & 14 Am Eminent Domain 5th
Amendment & 14th
Amendment
Separate police pwr - City Separate police power - City
can take, all right. ? Is can take, all right. Question is
whe ty can take sans whether they can take without
paying for it paying for it
Holmes & Brandeis Holmes and Brandeis took
opposite in Pa Coal opposite positions in
Pennsylvania Coal
In zonng, tr is a benefit ta In zoning, there is a benefit
accompanies t burden. No that accompanies the burden.
PP depriv in t long run. No private property
deprivation in the long run
Do n hv wi Landmark Do not have with Landmark
This enuf t push me over This is enough to push me over
TDRs n claimed t b = Transferable Development
what is taken Rights are not claimed to be
equal to what is taken
This Article relies on my translation of Justice Blackmun's
handwriting, including his shorthand, and does not just repeat verbatim
the shorthand itself. There is, of course, as a result some risk of
mistranslation. I have tried to minimize that possibility by not purporting
to translate the Justice's handwriting whenever I am not confident of its
17. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
18. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 59, 1978) (The




meaning or, at the very least, indicating in an accompanying footnote
when there is possible ambiguity. The translations allow for an
exceedingly rich portrayal of the Court's internal deliberations and, as a
result, a meaningful basis for evaluating the effectiveness of individual
Justices in deliberating with colleagues on the Court.
The conference notes, combined with the other documents within
the Blackmun Papers, provide a virtually unprecedented basis for both
learning and evaluating the efforts of individual Justices to influence the
Court's opinions beyond their own formal votes. One can perceive how
both the opinions and the votes of the individual Justices shift over time
as part of the Court's deliberative process, culminating in the release of
the Court's final opinion along with any separate concurring and
dissenting opinions. During that process, opinions are written and
rewritten in response to requests of individual Justices, and the final
result is even sometimes reversed between the time of the initial
conference vote and the final opinion. The ability of a Justice to keep a
majority in support of meaningful precedent or, conversely, to deprive
others on the Court of their majority to establish precedent that a Justice
opposes is generally unknown to those outside the Court. The Blackmun
Papers, however, make such knowledge possible."0
II. JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA, THE BLACKMUN PAPERS,
AND THE PROPERTY RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE SUPREME COURT
Justice Blackmun's tenure on the Court for just shy of twenty-five
years offers a wealth of possibilities for evaluating individual Justices and
substantive areas of law. This Article focuses on the property rights
movement in the Supreme Court because the issue is of both historic and
contemporary significance up to and including the Court's October 2004
Term. During Justice Blackmun's tenure, the Court ruled on nineteen
significant property rights cases involving regulatory takings claims."
20. This Article puts aside the legitimate issues that can be raised concerning the propriety of
Justice Blackmun's decision in his will to disclose this information so soon after his own retirement
and death. During an informal meeting in 2005 at which I was in attendance, a member of the Court
suggested that none of its then-current members were likely to emulate Blackmun in this respect and
they were instead more likely to provide for public disclosure only after the deaths of the Justices
serving on the Court at the time the notes were taken.
21. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (992); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of
Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987); Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (987);
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. County of Yolo, 477 U.S. 340 (1986);
Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172 (985);
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (t984); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419 (1982); Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314 (i98I); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (5985); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621
(198i); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (198o); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74
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Since Justice Blackmun's resignation, the Court has decided six more
cases," many of which build upon the earlier nineteen. This Article
further focuses on Justice Scalia because property rights is an area of law
in which Justice Scalia early on defined for himself a central role. Almost
immediately upon his arrival in fall 1986, the Court began regularly to
grant property owners petitions that raised the question whether
government land use regulation violated federal constitutional
protections for private property rights. For the same reason, this area of
law and the Blackmun Papers provide a fair basis for evaluating Justice
Scalia's effectiveness at influencing the direction of the Court's
decisionmaking in an area of law important to him.
A. THE PRE-SCALIA COURT
Just a few years prior to Justice Scalia's joining the Court in
September 1986, the Court decided several cases that raised issues
concerning the extent to which government could, consistently with the
Fifth Amendment, restrict private property rights. Most of these cases
raised legal issues related to the "regulatory taking issue," based on
Justice Holmes' opinion in 1922 for the Court in Pennsylvania Coal Co.
v. Mahon,23 ruling that land use regulations that go "too far" in their
restrictions on private property violate the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition on takings of private property in the absence of payment of
just compensation.' Several cases raised the question whether such an
unconstitutional taking had in fact occurred. Others raised the related
remedial question whether the Constitution itself required the payment
of just compensation for such regulatory takings or whether the
government regulator could satisfy the constitutional command simply
by invalidating the regulation prospectively. All of these cases serve as
the backdrop for assessing the Court's subsequent precedent, including
the impact of Justice Scalia.
i. Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York (1978)5
The Penn Central case concerned a regulatory takings challenge to
(198o); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (979); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Penn
Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
22. San Remo Hotel v. City and County of San Francisco, 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005); Lingle v.
Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning
Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002); Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6o6 (2001); City of Monterey v. Del
Monte Dunes at Monterey, LTD., 526 U.S. 687 (1999); Suitum v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 520
U.S. 725 (1997). Two other regulatory takings cases, not discussed in this Article, arose out of claims
brought against state laws that require lawyers to place all client funds in interest-bearing trust
accounts and require funds not capable of earning net interest to be deposited in accounts that pool
such funds so as to allow the payment of the resulting interest to charities. See Brown v. Legal Found.
of Wash., 538 U.S. 216 (2003); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1996).
23. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
24- Id. at 415.
25. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
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land use regulations imposed on historic landmarks. In 1967, New York
City's Landmarks Preservation Commission designated Grand Central
Station a "landmark" under the authority of New York City's Landmark
Preservation Law. Because of that designation, all future alterations to
the station required prior approval by the Commission. In return, the
City granted Penn Central, the owner of the station, "transferable
development rights" that could be used at other properties in the
immediate area owned by Penn Central to develop those other
properties more intensely than otherwise allowed."
In 1968, Penn Central submitted two separate applications to build
fifty-five-story and fifty-three-story office buildings on top of Grand
Central Station, for which Penn Central would make several million
dollars a year in rent." The commission denied both applications.' 8 Penn
Central filed suit claiming that the city's application of the law had
"taken" its property without just compensation, violating the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, and arbitrarily deprived them of their
property without due process. 9 The New York Court of Appeals rejected
the constitutional claim,3" and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed in an
opinion for the Court written by Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Stewart, White, Marshall, Powell, and Blackmun, and a dissent written
by then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Stevens.3'
Justice Brennan's majority opinion for the Court held that the
historic landmark restriction on development did not amount to a taking
of property requiring the payment of just compensation. The Court
reasoned that the restriction on development was constitutional because
it did not interfere with Penn Central's "primary expectation"
concerning the use of the property,32 which was use as a railroad terminal,
and it permitted Penn Central to "obtain a 'reasonable return' on its
investment."33 The Court emphasized that the restriction did not amount
to a flat prohibition against occupation of the air space, but was rather
merely a prohibition of Penn Central's preferred use.'
Ironically, in light of Penn Central's prominence in regulatory
takings jurisprudence today, Justice Brennan apparently sought in the
opinion to purport to be making no significant law at all. While a
26. Id. at 129.
27. Id. at 116-17.
28. Id. at t17.
29. Id. at 115-19.
30. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 366 N.E.2d 1271 (N.Y. t977).
31. Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104.
32. Id. at 136.
33. Id.
34- Id. at 136-37.
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majority favored rejection of the takings claim, other chambers in the
Court (in particular, Justice Stewart's) reportedly made clear at least to
the Brennan clerk responsible for the initial draft of the opinion that the
opinion should be essentially factbound and avoid any sweeping new
rulings of law. That is likely why the majority opinion commences by
candidly acknowledging that there is no "set formula" for regulatory
takings analysis and that resolution of such cases turns on the particular
facts of a case in light of basic principles of "justice and fairness."35 What
the Penn Central opinion does announce, in lieu of any takings formula,
is an "ad hoc" approach focusing on three "factors" that are especially
16relevant to resolution of a takings claim.3 The three factors include the
"economic impact" of the challenged land use restriction, the
restriction's "interference with distinct investment-backed expectations,"
and the "character of the governmental action."37 Finally, the Court ruled
that in evaluating a regulatory takings claim under the three-factor test,
courts should consider the impact on the "parcel as a whole" and not just
focus on any part of the property that might be the most burdened by the
challenged regulation."
The Blackmun Papers offer new insights into the Court's decision in
Penn Central, supporting the earlier reports that the opinion's purpose
was not to break new ground, and answer some curiosities about the case
that commentators (including this author) have long debated. According
to Blackmun's notes to himself prior to the oral argument and his
conference notes, he voted at conference to affirm the lower court's
rejection of the takings claim, but it was "not an easy [case for him]"
because "it has emotion."39 At conference, Justice Stewart stated that he
was voting to affirm, emphasizing that the lower courts had "found [Penn
Central] did not show not a reasonable return."4 But Justice Stewart also
described his resolution of the case as "[v]isceral rather [than] cerebral"
and cautioned that one "cannot make a bright line."4 Justice White, also
in the majority, stated that "[r]estriction on use in and of itself [is] not a
taking" and that an "ad hoc" approach is probably the result. 2 Brennan
himself added that the case depended on an inquiry into "the [particular
facts]" and how here, "[Penn Central] made no effort to prove [it could
35. Id. at 124.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 130-31.
39. Harry A. Blackmun, Pre-Argument Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 16, 1978) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
40. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 19, 1978) (The





not] make a [reasonable] return."'43 After first passing during conference,
Justice Marshall voted in favor of affirming, cryptically adding that the
case is "[a] messy mess."'
The two curiosities in the voting of the individual Justices in Penn
Central were supplied by Justice Powell and Justice Stevens. Justice
Powell, a former corporate lawyer, was known for being sympathetic to
business concerns, naturally skeptical of government economic
regulation, and, for this reason, generally supportive of property rights
claims.45 Powell, however, joined Justice Brennan's majority opinion. By
contrast, Justice Stevens, who has been the Justice most skeptical of
property rights claims and most sympathetic to government land use
regulation over time, 6 joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent. I have myself
speculated that the primary motivation for Justice Powell's vote likely
lies in his affinity for historic preservation, marked by his deep personal
involvement with Colonial Williamsburg in his native Virginia.47 My prior
speculation concerning Justice Stevens centered on the fact that a
historic landmark designation, unlike most general zoning restrictions, is
not generally applicable and therefore does not provide a "reciprocity of
advantage" in the form of shared benefits to all similarly situated
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Just a few months before being nominated to the Court, Justice Powell authored a
confidential memorandum to the U.S Chamber of Commerce describing what he characterized as an
"Attack on American Free Enterprise System," in which economic regulations featured prominently.
See Confidential Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr., to Eugene B. Sydnor, Jr., Chairman, U.S.
Chamber of Commerce Edu. Comm. (Aug. 23, 1971), available at http://www.mediatransparency.org/
story.php?StorylD=22 [hereinafter Powell Memorandum]; Richard J. Lazarus, Restoring What's
Environmental about Environmental Law in the Supreme Court, 47 UCLA L. REV. 703, 729-33 (2000)
[hereinafter Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental]; Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and
Discounting Holdings in the Supreme Court's Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099, 1120
(I997) [hereinafter Lazarus, Counting Votes].
46. In the years since the Court decided Penn Central Transportation. Co. v. New York City, 438
U.S. 104 (1978), Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinions in favor of government regulators in
Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987), and Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council,
Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2oo2), and routinely dissented in cases in which
property rights claims prevailed, including in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (987), Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825
(1987), Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512
U.S. 374 (1994), and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6o6 (2oo1).
47. Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental, supra note 45, at 729-33; Lazarus, Counting Votes,
supra note 45, at Ii2o.
Consider, for example, Justice Powell's sympathy for the historic preservation regulation
challenged in Penn Central and his hostility toward restrictions on coal mining challenged in
Keystone Bituminous. Justice Powell's contrasting votes might reflect nothing more than his
appreciation for historic preservation and coal. Each is well established in his home state of
Virginia, where one finds both Colonial Williamsburg and a heavy economic dependence
on coal mining.
[Vo1. 57:759
THE MEASURE OFA JUSTICE
landowners. 48
Both suspicions proved correct. Justice Powell, during the
conference, admitted that he had "2 Biases," which he described as being
"Williamsburgh" and "historic preservation values."49 He then added
that he would "try to affirm" the lower court," although he (along with
dissenters Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and Stevens) had
voted to hear the case at the jurisdictional stage." Justice Stevens, at
conference, made two basic points. His first was that the "Federal
Government in this business [i.e., historic landmarks] has always done it
at public expense."5 Stevens further described as "fundamental" the
"[d]istinction between the general and the particular. Zoning is general.
Landmarking is not."53
Finally, Brennan's opinion for the Court in Penn Central would seem
to highlight his special ability to fashion and keep majorities while
making law that he favored. In Penn Central, Brennan plainly lacked a
strong majority in favor of government regulation of private property
interests. Yet his opinion for the Court effectively held on to that
majority by purporting to announce a mere ad hoc approach, while
actually establishing a legal analytic framework that has proved generally
favorable to government regulation and that remains even now, twenty-
48. Lazarus, Counting Votes, supra note 45, at 1129 ("A likely distinction is that Penn Central is
the only takings case that involved a regulation targeting particular properties and landowners rather
than applying to all properties equally. The general applicability of the regulation was a factor that
Justice Stevens subsequently emphasized in Lucas while defending South Carolina's law.").
49. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 19, 1978) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). The latter reference to "historic preservation values" is not
completely clear from Blackmun's Conference Notes. Blackmun appears to have written "HP values"
after a reference to Williamsburg. But the same abbreviation that he used for what I read as "HP" is
also one that appears elsewhere in papers related to Penn Central (e.g., Blackmun Pre-Argument
Notes and Conference Notes on comments on other Justices, including Rehnquist), which undercuts
the certainty of this particular reading. It is even possible, based on those other references, that the
reference was either to "private property" or "real property" values. Even if so, such an alternative
reading simply underscores the conflict that Justice Powell felt between his two competing interests in
historic preservation, represented by Colonial Williamsburg, and private property.
50. Id.
51. Docket Sheet, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). Justice White,
who also voted in the majority, similarly voted to note probable jurisdiction in the case. Id.
52. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. i9, 1978) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
53. Id. Justice Stevens' joining then-Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion for the Court in Kaiser
Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (598o), rather than Justice Blackmun's dissent (joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall), may be similarly understood. At issue in that case was whether it amounted to
a taking of private property for the United States to insist that an owner of a private pond in Hawaii
had, by connecting their pond to a navigable water of the United States, lost the right to exclude the
public from their private water body. The Court ruled in favor of the property owner. Here again, the
focused nature of the burden placed on the property owner creates an equity issue not present in
general zoning, especially because the federal agency had initially advised the landowner of the lack of
federal jurisdiction over their plan to connect to the bay without ever suggesting that such a physical
connection would create a right of public access under federal law. Id.
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eight years later, the Court's leading precedent in regulatory takings."
2. Andrus v. Allard (T979)55
This case concerned a takings challenge to regulations promulgated
by the Secretary of the Interior pursuant to two federal laws, the Eagle
Protection Act and the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which barred
commercial transactions in parts of birds (e.g., feathers) killed before the
two statutes prohibited their killing. The opinion of the Court, once
again written by Justice Brennan, provides further support for his ability
as a Justice to maintain his majority while crafting an opinion that
declares substantive law that he favors." In this case, the parties disputed
both whether the federal law barred the sale of parts of birds killed
before their killing was unlawful and, if so, whether such a restriction on
commercial transactions amounted to an unconstitutional taking of
property. Justice Brennan wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court
(with Chief Justice Burger alone joining only in the judgment) in favor of
the Secretary of the Interior on both issues. 7
As revealed by the Blackmun Papers, however, the unanimity of the
final result evinces Justice Brennan's effectiveness as an influential
member of the Court. The original vote at conference was seven to two
in favor of upholding the regulations, with Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Stevens in dissent. Justice Powell also expressed substantial
concerns with Justice Brennan's draft opinion for the Court and
informed Brennan that if he could not accommodate those concerns,
Powell would write separately. 9 At the end of the day, however, neither
the Chief Justice nor Justice Stevens dissented, and Justice Powell did
not write separately, even though Brennan in fact declined to
accommodate Powell's concerns in any significant way.
The Chief changed his mind after concluding that the "'wildlife'
aspect places this case in a somewhat different category from Penn
54. See infra text accompanying notes 392-93.
55. 444 U.S. 51 (979).
56. Justice Brennan was well known for using his personal charm and his related ability to forge
majorities on the Court. See Thurgood Marshall, Tribute, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
104 HARV. L. REv. 1, 5 (i990); Abner J. Mikva, Tribute, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan, Jr.,
104 HARV. L. REV. 9, to (I99o); Richard A. Posner, Tribute, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 13, 14 (I99o); Nina Totenberg, Tribute, A Tribute to Justice William J. Brennan,
Jr., 104 HARV. L. REV. 33,37-38 (i99o).
57. Andrus, 444 U.S. at 68.
58. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Andrus v. Allard, No. 78-740 (The Blackmun Papers,
supra note 2). At the jurisdictional stage, Justices White, Rehnquist, and Stevens voted to note
probable jurisdiction and Justice Marshall stated that he would "join 3," which means he was willing to
provide the necessary fourth vote if there were three other Justices favoring plenary review. The notes
regarding the Chief Justice's vote on jurisdiction are harder to decipher. He appears to have favored
review. See Docket Sheet, Andrus, No. 78-740 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
59. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Andrus, No. 78-740
(Oct. 31, 1979) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
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Central" (from which he dissented).6° Justice Stevens changed his mind
on the statutory construction issue when "[f]urther study" persuaded him
that Brennan was "correct in stating that a flat proscription on the sale of
wildlife, without regard to the legality of its taking, is and for a long time
has been a traditional legislative tool for enforcing conservation policy."
6'
Justice Powell's ultimate acquiescence, however, is the most telling. He
objected strenuously to the statement in Brennan's draft opinion that
"'loss of future profits.., provides a slender reed upon which to rest a
takings claim. ' ', 62 Powell likewise objected to the draft opinion's failure to
make clear that the only reason that a prohibition on sale was not a
taking in this case was based on a "nuisance theory" that allows such an
"extraordinary intrusion on property rights.., only when lesser
measures cannot accomplish an important government purpose. ' ,6, Justice
Brennan's final opinion for the Court, however, neither abandoned
either aspect of his original opinion in any significant way, nor lost
Justice Powell's vote.64 Brennan plainly managed to assuage Powell's
concerns without losing the opinion's force. History, moreover, has
proved Justice Powell's concerns well-placed given the prominence that
government regulators have effectively given, when defending against
takings challenges, to the parts of the Andrus v. Allard opinion about
which Powell complained, especially the opinion's characterization of
profits as being a "slender reed.
',6,
3. Agins v. City of Tiburon (1980)66
Agins involved a classic regulatory takings challenge to a local land
use regulation that limited the amount of permissible residential
development. The plaintiffs owned five acres of undeveloped land in
Tiburon, California. When the City enacted an ordinance restricting
development in order to promote preservation of open space values,
plaintiffs brought a lawsuit claiming that restricting their land to single-
family dwellings, with density restrictions allowing up to five such
residences on a five acre plot, amounted to an unconstitutional taking of
private property for which they were entitled to a payment of "just
60. Letter from Chief Justice Warren E. Burger to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Andrus, No. 78-
740 (Nov. 19, 1979) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
6i. Letter from Justice John Paul Stevens to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Andrus, No. 78-740
(Oct. 3t, 1979) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
62. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Andrus, No. 78-740
(Oct. 31, 1979).(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
63. Id.
64. Compare Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979), with Andrus, No. 78-740, slip op. 12-15.
65. See, e.g., Amici Curiae Brief of State of California et al. at 23, Keystone Bituminous Coal
Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) (No. 85-1092), t986 WL 728344; Amici Curiae Brief of
State of California et al. at 7 n.7, MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986)
(No. 84-2015), 1985 WL 669430.
66. 447 U.S. 255 (I98O).
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compensation" by the Fifth Amendment. The landowners specifically
sought a damage remedy rather than mere invalidation of the offending
ordinance. The U.S. Supreme Court granted review after the California
Supreme Court ruled that no such money damage remedy was available
under the Constitution. The Court, however, ended up affirming the
state court judgment without reaching the remedy issue after concluding
that the development restrictions in no event constituted a taking of
property in the first instance.
67
Justice Powell wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court disposing of
the case.68 Although dubbed by Justice Blackmun's clerk working on the
case as "one of the dullest [cases] to have come down the pike this
year,"'6 Powell's opinion proved the potential for a Justice to make
considerable law in writing a unanimous end of the Term decision that
none of the other chambers may have been likely to read closely. Indeed,
Blackmun's conference notes show that at least five of the Justices were
open to disposing of the case without any opinion, by just dismissing the
appeal for want of substantial federal question.7'
The Chief Justice assigned the case to Justice Powell for the drafting
of the Court's opinion, and he produced an opinion that, until very
recently," played a significant role in the Court's takings law. The Agins
opinion announced a new regulatory takings test, under which a land use
regulation is a taking if it "does not substantially advance legitimate state
interests" or it "denies an owner economically viable use of his land."7
Although the Court easily concluded that the City of Tiburon's
ordinance satisfied both tests, the upshot was nonetheless a new
direction in takings law.
The crafting of the Court's opinion strongly suggests that Justice
Powell was carefully, and subtly, moving the Court toward a more
aggressive view of the Takings Clause, perhaps partly in response to his
failure to get Justice Brennan to modify his opinion for the Court earlier
that same Term in Andrus.73 Powell's creation of the "economically
viable use" test, for instance, was far from obvious. It required his
resurrection of what had previously been seen as an incidental statement
about economic viability in a final footnote of the Penn Central majority
67. Id.
68. At the jurisdictional stage, the Chief Justice, and Justices White, Powell, and Rehnquist voted
in favor of Supreme Court review, and Justice Marshall indicated his willingness to supply the fourth
vote for review if there were three other Justices supporting review. See Docket Sheet, Agins, No. 79-
602 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
69. Clerk Bench Memo at I8, Agins, No. 79-602 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
70. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Agins, No. 79-602 (Apr. 18, I98o) (The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 2).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 375-76.
72. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (i98o).
73. See supra text accompanying notes 63-64; Powell Memorandum, supra note 45.
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opinion.74 Close examination of the oral argument in Penn Central,
however, provides strong support for the notion that Powell may well
have been responsible for Justice Brennan's inclusion of the language
that Powell later effectively exploited in Agins.75 The conference notes
for Penn Central provide some additional support for that thesis.
According to those notes, Powell raised at conference the very question
that the final Penn Central footnote sought to answer about whether
Penn Central might have a valid takings claim in the future under
different and less favorable economic conditions.76 But, whatever its
origins, the "economically viable" test that Justice Powell wrote into the
Court's opinion in Agins subsequently proved fertile breeding ground for
what is widely considered the high water mark for the property rights
movement in Justice Scalia's announcement of a per se takings test
twelve years later in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council."
The other prong of the Agins test-whether the regulation
"substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests"78-likewise strongly
expanded constitutional protection of property rights, even while the
Agins Court was seemingly just quickly dismissing a takings claim that
lacked all merit. As now revealed by the Blackmun Papers, then-Justice
Rehnquist is the one member of the Court who took explicit notice of
the potential shift implicated by the test and specifically questioned
Powell about it in formal written correspondence between their
chambers. Rehnquist expressed some disquiet -"somewhat uneasy"-
about the lack of latitude that the substantially advance test appeared to
give local government and proposed to Powell substitute language that
would "allow[] the states somewhat more latitude." 9 Rehnquist indicated
that if Powell declined, he would "simply write a short separate
concurrence." 80 Powell did in fact decline,8' but Rehnquist nevertheless
joined Powell's majority opinion for the Court without any separate
writing.
With the benefit of hindsight, Justice Rehnquist's concerns were
74. See Agins, 447 U.S. at 26o (citing Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
138 n.36 (1978)).
75. Transcript of Oral Argument at 41-44, Penn Cent., 438 U.S. 104 (No. 77-444); see Lazarus,
Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the U.S. Supreme Court, supra note 45,
at 733 & n.171.
76. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Penn Cent., No. 77-444 (Apr. 19, 1978) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("If ICC [Interstate Commerce Commission] ordered closure [of
Grand Central], the court could reopen [the takings claim.]").
77. 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992); see infra text accompanying notes 256-57.
78. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 261 (i98o).
79. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Agins, No. 79-602
(May 29, 598o) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
8o. Id.
8I. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice William H. Rehnquist, Agins, No. 79-602
(May 29, i98o) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
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remarkably prescient. As discussed below," six years later, Justice Scalia
relied on the "substantially advance" language of Agins in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission"3  to construct a more exacting
constitutional standard applicable to land use regulatory exactions that
lift otherwise applicable restrictions on development. And, even more
remarkably, also as discussed below, 4 the entire Court twenty-five years
later in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. unanimously overruled the Agins
"substantially advance" test on the ground that "it has no proper place in
our takings jurisprudence."5 Coming full circle, Chief Justice Rehnquist
agreed. In Lingle, he joined the Court's opinion repudiating the very
language in the Agins opinion that he had originally found troubling."
4. San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego (i98i)87
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego was the last of the
significant regulatory takings cases decided by the Court prior to Justice
Scalia's joining the Court. The case raised the remedy issue that had
motivated the Court's grant of review in Agins v. City of Tiburon, but
which the Court nonetheless did not reach upon concluding that there
was no taking of property and therefore no occasion to discuss remedy.
Because the Justices granted review in San Diego Gas & Electric almost
82. See infra text accompanying note 231.
83. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
84. See infra text accompanying notes 375-76.
85. 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2083 (2005).
86. Rehnquist's foresight was similarly evident in comments he made to Justice Blackmun
concerning Blackmun's draft majority opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986 (1984). The
case concerned a regulatory takings challenge to a federal statute that provided for public disclosure of
trade secret information included in a pesticide company's application for a federally mandated
pesticide registration. Rehnquist expressed concern with the draft opinion's notion that a taking could
not occur so long as the pesticide company had notice of the possible disclosure prior to submitting the
registration application. In correspondence to Blackmun, Rehnquist asked whether this portion of the
opinion either decided or intimated "that it would be consistent with the 'takings' clause for a board of
supervisors to provide that all submissions of subdivision of more than 40 acres made after a particular
date would have to include a deed of at least 25% of the gross acreage owned to the county as a
park?" See Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Ruckelshaus v.
Monsanto, No. 83-196 (June 12, 1984) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). Although Blackmun
apparently declined any change and Rehnquist here too did not dissent or otherwise write separately,
Rehnquist's concern was well placed. In fact, government attorneys relied on that portion of the
majority opinion in Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto to make the very argument Rehnquist found potentially
troubling. In particular, in two subsequent regulatory takings cases-Nollan v. California Coastal
Commission in 1992 and Palazzolo v. Rhode Island in 2001 -relying on Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, they
contended that so long as a landowner had notice of a development restriction prior to purchasing the
property, they could not later complain of an unconstitutional taking, even if that restriction required
dedication to the government of a portion of their property. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent Rhode
Island at 46, Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606 (2OO) (No. 99-2047), 2001 WL 22908; Brief for
Council of State Governments et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Appellee at 23, Nollan v. Cal.
Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (No. 86-133), 5987 WL 864767. However, notwithstanding
Rehnquist's correctness in identifying the possibility of such an application of Ruckelshaus, the Court
had little trouble subsequently rejecting the arguments in both Nollan and Palazzolo.
87. 450 U.S. 621 (I98i).
[Vol. 57:759
THE MEASURE OF A JUSTICE
immediately after deciding Agins, it has long been assumed 8 that the
Justices linked the two cases and granted the second to reach the Agins
remedy issue. The Blackmun Papers now confirm the correctness of that
assumption. In a "Memorandum to the Conference" dated one day after
the Court issued its opinion in Agins, Justice Powell wrote the other
members of the Court about the San Diego opinion, describing it as
"present[ing] the remedies issue that was not reached in Agins," and
recommending plenary review."' In his handwritten notes on the case,
Justice Blackmun succinctly declared: "Agins v. Tiburon revisited."'
In an opinion written by Justice Blackmun, the Court ultimately
frustrated the landowners (and several members of the Court) by failing
again to reach the remedy issue. This time, however, the obstacle was the
absence of a final state court judgment. Chief Justice Burger, Justices
White, Stevens, and Rehnquist, all joined Justice Blackmun's majority
opinion for the Court. The gravamen of the majority opinion was that
the state court's failure to decide whether a taking had occurred
prevented the Court from having jurisdiction to review the state court's
inherently non-final discussion of what remedy would exist were there a
taking.9'
The most significant part of the case, however, was the dissenting
opinion authored by Justice Brennan, because of its portent for the
remedy issue once it did reach the Court in a future case. The dissent
concluded that the Fifth Amendment, by its own terms, compelled a
money damages remedy for "just compensation" for regulatory takings
of private property." According to the dissent, although government
could avoid a forced purchase of the property by rescinding the
offending regulation prospectively, the government still had to pay the
property owner "just compensation" for the temporary taking that had
necessarily occurred prior to that rescission.93
The fact, moreover, that Justice Brennan authored the dissent
(joined by three other Justices) left little doubt that a majority of the
Justices would be willing to embrace the dissent's view of the remedy
issue once a case properly presented that issue to the Court. As one of
the more liberal members of the Court and a Justice whom
88. See, e.g., Anti Trust Cost Case is Accepted, N.Y. TIMES, June 17, 198o, at Di ("The Justices,
apparently eager to settle questions unresolved in last week's opinion on the rights of property owners
whose land is rezoned for conservation, agreed to hear an appeal by a California utility from a decision
denying it the right to sue for damages for the rezoning of its property.").
89. Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Memorandum to the Conference, Agins, No. 79-602 (June is, 198o) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
90. Harry A. Blackmun, Pre-Argument Notes, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Nov. 30, i98o )
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note z).
9
I
. San Diego Gas & Elec., 450 U.S. at 631-32.
92. Id. at 646-61 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 653-61.
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environmentalists and government regulators had presumed to be
sympathetic to land use regulation, Brennan's position made
immediately apparent that the Court was prepared to rule in favor of
property owners on the remedy issue. While Justice Marshall's decision
to join Justice Brennan's dissent made that likelihood a virtual certainty,
Justice Rehnquist filed a separate concurring opinion to remove any
possible doubt. While agreeing with (and joining) the Court's holding
concerning the absence of a final state court judgment, Justice
Rehnquist's concurrence added that, in the absence of that jurisdictional
bar, he "would have little difficulty in agreeing with much of what is said
in the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan."' In fact, as discussed
below,95 six years later, then-Chief Justice Rehnquist authored an opinion
for the Court in First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles 6 that effectively converted the Brennan dissent into a
majority ruling.
The Blackmun Papers add a further gloss to the case and the
internal decisionmaking dynamics within the Court. Although the Chief
Justice assigned Justice Blackmun the responsibility for drafting the
opinion of the Court based on the conference vote of a five Justice
majority,97 Justice Blackmun lost one of his votes and potentially the
Court opinion when Justice Marshall subsequently switched sides in
favor of Justice Brennan's dissent. 8 The switch meant that the Brennan
dissent could become the opinion of the Court, relegating Blackmun to
the dissent. Indeed, Justice Blackmun was apparently so unhappy about
the possible loss of a Court majority that he wrote a letter to Chief
Justice Rehnquist, seeming to blame him for this development. In
particular, he chided the Chief Justice for not heeding Justice
Blackmun's advice given "now four weeks ago, that you vote fairly
promptly so that, it was to be hoped, your vote would have some
influence upon Thurgood.... Thurgood has now slipped away, as
perhaps was not to be unanticipated whenever Bill Brennan is on the
other side and writing the dissent."'
Justice Blackmun succeeded in keeping the majority only because
Rehnquist decided to switch sides after originally voting with Brennan on
the jurisdictional issue."' Rehnquist did so only after obtaining
94. Id. at 633-34 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
95. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97.
96. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
97. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Dec. 3, 198o)
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
98. Id.; Docket Sheet, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Dec. 3, I98O) (The Blackmun Papers,
supra note 2).
99. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, San Diego Gas &
Elec., No. 79-678 (Mar. II, 1981) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
too. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Dec. 3, 1980)
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assurances from Blackmun that Blackmun's opinion would not rely on or
otherwise cite to Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,' an earlier Supreme
Court case from which Rehnquist dissented. The Blackmun Papers
include a handwritten note from Rehnquist to Blackmun asking him
about the impact of his draft opinion on Cox, but also adding: "If this is
an unfair question, you will not offend me by throwing this in the waste
basket."'.. Blackmun replied the next day with a memo explaining why
Cox was not implicated.'"
Finally, the Blackmun Papers further reveal that although Justice
Brennan voted at conference to reverse on the remedy issue, he
expressed a fair amount of ambivalence at the time. He apparently began
his remarks at conference by stating that he was "confused."' 4 After
explaining, moreover, his reasons for believing that invalidation of the
regulation deemed a taking was not, by itself, a sufficient constitutional
remedy, he added that he was "not fully at rest."'0 5
5. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CA TV Corp. (I982)'6
In Loretto, the Court faced a different kind of takings claim against
local government, which produced a different lineup of the Justices and
introduced a new per se test for certain kinds of government actions. In
Penn Central," the Court had described the "character of the
governmental action" as one of the three factors especially relevant to
takings analysis,' ° and elaborated by adding that "[a] 'taking' may more
readily be found when the interference with property can be
characterized as a physical invasion by government."'" In Loretto, the
Court announced that a permanent physical occupation of another's real
property authorized by government amounted to a per se taking, without
the need for any formal balancing under Penn Central."' The Court
reasoned that "when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of a
permanent physical occupation, a taking has occurred. In such a case,
'the character of the government action' not only is an important factor
in resolving whether the action works a taking but also is
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
101. 420 U.S. 469 (I975).
102. Handwritten Note from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, San
Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Jan. 21, i98I) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
103. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William H. Rehnquist, San Diego Gas &
Elec., No. 79-678 (Jan. 22, 1981) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
104. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, San Diego Gas & Elec., No. 79-678 (Dec. 3, 1980)
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
105. Id.
io6. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
I07. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
io8. Id. at 124.
to9. Id.




At issue in Loretto was a New York City law that required landlords
to allow cable television operators to place cables in buildings owned by
the landlord as necessary to provide cable television service to tenants in
the building and to "crossover" to reach tenants in nearby buildings. The
municipal law required that the cable company pay a "reasonable fee" to
the landlords. The city had concluded that fee should amount to one
dollar. Prior to New York's enactment of this law, cable operators had to
negotiate with individual landowners for access and for terms of
payment, which typically amounted to five percent of the gross cable
television revenues from that property."'
The voting lineup on the Court was significant because Justices
Marshall and Brennan were on opposite sides. It was also the first
takings case after Justice O'Connor joined the Court. Justice Marshall
wrote the majority opinion for the Court in favor of the property owners,
which Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Powell, Stevens, and
O'Connor joined. Justice Blackmun dissented and was joined by Justices
White and Brennan. The former Solicitor General and Harvard Law
School Dean, Erwin Griswold, represented the respondents cable
television companies and City of New York at oral argument in the
case."
3
Blackmun's conference notes show that the Chief Justice originally
passed prior to voting in favor of the landlords."4 He acknowledged that
he had "trouble with this case""' 5 because of the possible analogy to
municipal requirements for the location of sprinklers and smoke alarms,
but he ultimately concluded that the "educational value" of cable
television "does not bring this to a level with sprinklers.""..6 The
conference notes also show that even those Justices (like Brennan and
White) who ended up dissenting in favor of the City and cable television
operators distinguished between cables used for providing service to
tenants in the landowner's own building and "crossover" cables
providing service in other buildings. Justice Brennan favored the
landlords' position on the "crossover" issue, and Justice White at
conference was unsure of his vote on that issue, tentatively voting in
favor of the respondents. Justice Powell at conference voted like
Brennan, although he ended up subsequently joining the majority in its
iii. Id.
112. Id. at 423.
113. Id. at 420.
114. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Loretto, No. 81-244 (Apr. 2, 1982) (The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 2).
115. Id. ("I hv trouble wi this case.").
116. Id. ("St hs t pwr t compell sprinkler smoke warnings etc. But this? *** Educ value ds n bmg
this to a level wi sprinklers").
[Vol. 57:759
THE MEASURE OFA JUSTICE
entirety."7
Justice Marshall saw the issue very simply. He exclaimed at
conference, "[I] cannot buy this"; he saw no difference between the
crossover and non-crossover issue for the simple reason that in either
case it was "my roof."" 8 Justice Stevens likewise stated that he felt "very
strongly" that the landowners should win. As in Penn Central, Stevens
here too indicated that the absence of general reciprocity was key. The
conference notes suggest he said that it would be "OK" if every building
had to do this, "[b]ut here a special company and the City takes the five
percent whenever they want." Stevens also noted that Griswold "did a
fine snow job" in arguing the case for respondents."9 Finally, Blackmun's
conference notes on O'Connor are striking because, as in future
occasions, 22 Blackmun emphasizes what he perceives as the emotional
character of her views. He describes O'Connor as voting in favor of
respondents and saying the case is "shocking!" and "unbelievable!"'
What, in retrospect, Loretto contributed to the Court's taking
jurisprudence was a potential analytic line of departure from the Penn
Central balancing framework embraced by Justice Brennan in his
opinion for the Court in that case. The Court opinion in Loretto
endorsed the potential for extracting from Penn Central a series of per se
takings tests, defining circumstances when Penn Central balancing would
not be required. Justice Scalia subsequently seized upon this precedent
to try to do just that a decade later.'22
6. Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank (1985)'23
Three years later, the Court returned for yet a third time to the
regulatory takings damage remedy issue, but once again without
success. 24 In Williamson County v. Hamilton Bank, the Sixth Circuit had,
relying on the four Justices joining Justice Brennan's San Diego dissent
117. Id.
118. Id. ("Cann buy this *** no dif btw t 2-my roof').
II9. Id. ("Very strongly *** PP OK wn every dldg is t do this & so. But here a special co & t city
takes t 5% wnever ty want *** Griswold did a fine sno job").
i2O. See infra note 209. Blackmun's characterization of the views of Justice O'Connor on this
occasion and on others arguably reflect an apparent antipathy toward O'Connor or at least suspicion
of her that Blackmun harbored almost as soon as she joined the Court. A recent biography of
O'Connor documents that hostility and suggests that it may have resulted from possible jealousy about
the tremendous amount of attention being received by O'Connor upon joining the Court, or
alternatively, might have derived from concern that the new Justice might vote to overrule Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See JOAN BISKUPIC, SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR-How THE FIRST WOMAN ON
THE SUPREME COURT BECAME ITS MOST INFLUENTIAL JUSTICE 114, 140, 160-61 (2005).
I2I. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Loretto, No. 81-244 (Apr. 2, 1982) (The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 2).
122. See infra text accompanying notes 256-57.
123. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
124. The Court also tried to reach the remedy issue but again failed because of the absence of
ripeness in MacDonald, Somer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 (1986).
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and Justice Rehnquist's concurring statement in that same case, ruled
that the Constitution compelled a damage remedy for a temporary
regulatory taking. The Supreme Court again granted review but reversed
for lack of ripeness, thereby frustrating property rights advocates one
more time.'
Justice Blackmun wrote the opinion for the Court, which Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Brennan, Marshall, Rehnquist, and
O'Connor joined. The majority held that the regulatory takings claim
was not ripe on two separate grounds. The first deficiency was that there
had been no "final decision" because the landowner had failed to submit
a final development application with the relevant governmental body,
including one for available variances. ,6 Absent such a final governmental
ruling, it was not possible to assess an as-applied takings claim. The
second, independent ground for lack of ripeness was that the landowner
had never pursued available state administrative or judicial avenues for
obtaining "just compensation" for any taking resulting from the
application of a state regulation. Consequently, no viable claim could be
made in federal court that there had been a taking without "just
compensation" in violation of the Fifth Amendment. An owner of
property claiming, therefore, that a state regulation violates the Fifth
Amendment must first establish that the state denied her "just
compensation.' ' .7 Justice White dissented on the ground that the takings
claim was ripe for review."" Justices Brennan and Marshall joined the
majority, but also wrote separately to make clear that they were adhering
to the views expressed on the remedy issue in the San Diego dissent. "9
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment on the ground that it was clear
that the landowner was not entitled to any damage remedy because there
had been no temporary taking.3 Justice Powell took no part in the
consideration or decision in the case.
3'
The Blackmun Papers show that at conference the vote was similar
to the final outcome except that Justice Rehnquist gave a "tentative"
vote in favor of the landowner and affirmance, but also acknowledged
that he was "[i]n equipoise.' 3' He also wrote Chief Justice Burger a few
days after conference to explain that he thought that his "vote to affirm
in this case may be misleading."'33 Somewhat surprisingly in light of his
125. 473 U.S. at i9o-94.
126. ld. at 19o-91.
127. Id. at 194-97.
128. Id. at 200.
129. Id. at 201.
130. Id. at 202-06.
131. Id. at 174.
132. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Williamson County, No. 84-4 (Feb. 22, 1985) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
133. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Chief Justice Warren E. Burger, Williamson
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other precedent, Rehnquist stated that he "d[id]n't think a 'taking' clause
analysis [was] proper when there has been no physical invasion and no
effort to acquire by condemnation."'34 And, in a subsequent letter to
Justice Blackmun, asking for a change in the draft majority opinion,'35
Rehnquist further acknowledged that "[t]his was a tough case to be
assigned the opinion to write, because as I recall we were split up all over
the lot at Conference.'
36
B. SCALIA ON THE COURT
Soon after Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court in 1986, he
quickly became the property rights movement's strongest ally on the
bench. During his very first Term, he voted in favor of greater protection
of property owners in all four of the significant property rights cases
before the Court that Term. 137 In the last of the four, Nollan v. California
Coastal Commission,3s in which Scalia himself authored the opinion for
the Court, the Court held that a land use regulation amounted to an
unconstitutional taking-the first time the Court had done so since
Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon in I922.13' The opinion's rhetoric, moreover,
was entirely sympathetic to the claims of the property rights movement,
County, No. 84-4 (Feb. 25, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
134. Id.
135. Rehnquist asked Blackmun to include in his opinion an analogy to Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S.
527 (I98I), to which Blackmun agreed. See Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry
A. Blackmun, Re: Williamson Planning Commission [sic], No. 84-4 (June to, 1985) (The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William H. Rehnquist, Re:
Williamson County, No. 84-4 (June it, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). Apparently, at
Justice Brennan's insistence, Blackmun also included a footnote limiting the significance of the
citation to Parratt, to which Rehnquist then objected. Blackmun ultimately redrafted the opinion in a
manner that satisfied both Rehnquist and Brennan, while decrying to the former the challenges
presented to the opinion writer "encounter[ing] the usual cross-fire between" conflicting positions of
individual Justices all in the majority. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, Re: Williamson County, No. 84-4 (June 12, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2);
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William H. Rehnquist, Re: Williamson Planning
Commission, No. 84-4 (June 13, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Justice
William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Re: Williamson County, No. 84-4 (June 13, 1985)
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
136. Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Williamson
Planning Comm'n, No. 84-4 (June To, 1985) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
137. See Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); Hodel v. Irving,
481 U.S. 704 (1987); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles,
482 U.S. 304 (1987); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). I am treating as less
significant here a fifth takings case before the Court that same Term, United States v. Cherokee Nation
of Oklahoma, 480 U.S. 700 (1987). The Court in that case unanimously ruled that the federal
government could exercise its navigation servitude power to regulate navigational uses of waters and
that any resulting harm to riparian interests or owners of the navigable riverbed does not amount to a
taking of private property because all owners of such property hold their property subject to that
dominant governmental power.
138. 483 U.S. 825.
139. 26o U.S. 393 (1922).
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expressing marked disdain for the efficacy, if not good faith motivation,
of environmental land use regulators. When, six years later, Justice Scalia
followed up on Nollan with his seemingly sweeping opinion for the Court
favorable to the landowner in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,'4
the property rights movement had every reason to believe that it had
found a champion on the High Court.
The Blackmun Papers, however, suggest a different story and
outcome. They show not only that Justice Scalia did not immediately
embrace the agenda of the property rights movement in all respects, but
that once he did, he stumbled. Ironically, the reason for his stumble may
have been his willingness to embrace the movement's sharp rhetoric
rather than his ability to craft the kinds of opinions more likely to further
the movement's interests over the longer term.
i. Hodel v. Irving (1987)"'
The first case argued on Justice Scalia's first day on the bench (and
also Rehnquist's first as Chief Justice), Hodel v. Irving, raised a
regulatory takings issue, albeit in an unusual context. In response to the
increasing fragmentation of ownership of Indian Lands, Congress
enacted the Indian Land Consolidation Act of 1983, providing that no
undivided fractional interest in Indian lands shall descend by intestacy or
devise, but, instead, shall escheat to the tribe "if such interest represents
2 per centum or less of the total acreage in such tract and has earned to
its owner less than $ioo in the preceding year before it is due to
escheat. , , 142
The federal statute did not provide for any payment of
compensation to the owners of the interests escheated to the tribe
pursuant to this provision. The Court unanimously struck down the
federal statute as unconstitutional. Justice O'Connor authored the
majority opinion for seven members of the Court, which applied the
Penn Central three-factor analysis in ruling that the federal escheat
provision amounted to an unconstitutional taking."'3 Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun joined the majority opinion, but also joined
Brennan's short separate concurring opinion stating the view that the
Court ruling did not disturb the Court's decision in Andrus v. Allard."
The Chief Justice and Justices Scalia and Powell likewise joined the
majority opinion, but also filed a competing concurring opinion,
authored by Justice Scalia, which contended that Andrus v. Allard was
140. 505 U.S. 1003 (I992).
141. 481 U.S. 704 (1987).
142. Pub. L. 97-459, tit. 11, 96 Stat. 2519 (1983).
143. Hodel, 481 U.S. at 713-18.
i44. Id. at 718.
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now limited to the facts of that case.'45 Finally, Justice Stevens filed a
separate concurring opinion, joined by Justice White, finding the federal
law unconstitutional, but for lack of notice as required by due process
rather than on takings grounds.' 46
The Blackmun Papers reveal the reason why it took the Court more
than seven months (until May i8, 1987) to decide a case argued the first
Monday of October. Certainly, there was little about this case that would
have prompted outside observers to anticipate that its resolution would
have produced such a struggle within the Court. The nature of that
struggle, however, especially the role that Justice Scalia played in its
promotion and persistence, is emblematic of his tenure on the Court ever
since.
As described by Blackmun's Oral Argument Notes, during the
argument itself, Justice Scalia was "hung up on" the question whether
the plaintiffs even had standing to bring this claim.'47 What was most
remarkable about Scalia's questioning, however, was how hard he
pressed the federal government for not taking a sufficiently aggressive
position in arguing that plaintiffs lacked standing."'" Although the Court's
final opinion ultimately appeared to have little trouble concluding that
standing was in fact easily met, much of the oral argument was
dominated by Scalia's aggressive questioning of the attorney from the
Solicitor General's Office. Indeed, legal commentary of the day focused
on Scalia's questioning at oral argument in Hodel v. Irving, remarking
upon his effectiveness in calling the executive branch to task.'49
Blackmun's conference notes further reveal that the initial vote
concerning the federal law's possible unconstitutionality was not as
lopsided as that when the Court announced its opinion seven months
later.' The Chief Justice and Justice Brennan both stated that there was
no taking and that the due process notice issue was not before the
Court. I'' Justice Powell agreed that there was no constitutional
infirmity.'52 Justice Stevens agreed that there was no taking, but indicated
that he would reach the due process issue and find the law
unconstitutional on that distinct ground based on lack of notice as
145. Id. at 719.
146. Id. at 719-34.
147. Harry A Blackmun, Oral Argument Notes, Hodel, No. 85-637 (Oct. 6, I986) (The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 2).
148. See Official Report of Oral Argument, Hodel v. Irving, No. 85-637 (Oct. 6, 1986).
149. Stephen J Adler, Scalia's Court: How the Newest Justice Has Effected a Quiet Revolution in
the Rehnquist Court, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, Mar. 1987.
15o. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Hodel, No. 85-637 (Oct. 8, 5986) (The Blackmun





applied to those who died early. '
There was, moreover, significant tentativeness in the votes of the
five members of the Court who stated that the federal statute amounted
to an unconstitutional taking. Justice White stated that although he was
voting with the majority, he was "not now so sure" and he had thought
"that easy for US at first." '54 Justice Marshall said he shared White's
views. 5  Justice O'Connor described her view of the merits as
"tentative," and Justice Scalia did not think the federal statute was
unconstitutional in all applications.' He contended the escheat provision
did not constitute a taking or due process deprivation as applied to those
who died intestate, but did when applied to those who sought to pass on
their property by devise.' 57 Because Justice Blackmun's conference notes
never elaborate upon the reasons he may have expressed for his vote, all
we know is that he voted to affirm the lower court's judgment that the
federal law was an unconstitutional taking.
After Justice White (as the senior Justice in the majority) assigned
the opinion for the Court to Justice Stevens, the Court quickly broke
down. Justice Stevens, consistent with his discussion at conference,
circulated within a few weeks to the other chambers a draft opinion that
rested exclusively on the absence of due process and otherwise sought to
limit the ruling to the Indian trust relationship. Justice O'Connor
immediately responded with a letter to Justice Stevens, declining to join
the opinion, restating her preference to affirm the lower court judgment
in part on the basis of the Takings Clause, and declaring her intent to
"await further writing."': The next day Justice Scalia wrote a letter to
Stevens saying that he "share[d] Sandra's concerns," thought that the
"elimination of the right to pass property by will violates the takings
clause, although its change in what happens to property absent a will
does not."'59 Scalia added that he intended "to try [his] hand at an
opinion along these lines in the hope of persuading you and the rest of
my colleagues." '6 One day later, Justice Powell stated in a letter to
Stevens that he was "not at rest" and would await "further writing."'
6'






158. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice John Paul Stevens, Hodel, No. 85-687
(Nov. 3, 1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
r59. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Justice John Paul Stevens, Hodel, No. 85 -68 7 (Nov. 4,
1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
i6o. Id.
i61. Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice John Paul Stevens, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Nov.
5. 1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
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"in somewhat the same position as that taken by Sandra and Nino" and
would "await further writing or shall pen a few words myself.I6,
It was not, however, until late February that Justice Scalia finally
circulated his draft opinion in the case and let it be known, at least
through his law clerks, that he hoped to secure a majority for his views
and therefore convert his concurrence into an opinion of the Court.
63
Unlike his statements at conference and in his earlier correspondence
with Stevens, Scalia's draft concluded that the federal statute was a
taking whether or not the property was transmitted by descent or by
devise.'6 ' In addition, as described by one of Blackmun's law clerks, the
draft opinion took "a restrictive view of standing" and made "broad
statements" that "seem to be a reflection of Justice Scalia's personal
philosophy and not at all necessary to a decision in the case."',
6
,
Although Justice Blackmun had voted at conference that the federal
law was a taking,' 66 which was the same result advocated by Scalia's draft,
Blackmun declined to join the opinion. According to Blackmun's law
clerk, the "fundamental problem" with the Scalia opinion was that it
"eschews the traditional takings balancing analysis entirely" in favor of
"a hard and fast rule with implications far beyond 'Indian' cases. '67
Perhaps for this same reason, however, Justice Powell and the Chief
Justice, both of whom had voted on the other side at conference, were
the first to join Scalia's opinion, each stating in separate letters that they
found the opinion "persuasive.' 68 In short, it appears that once Justice
Scalia decided in February to use the Hodel v. Irving case to further a
broader property rights agenda, two members of the Court more
sympathetic to that agenda were quickly willing to change their earlier
views about this particular case and sign on.
According to the memorandum prepared by Justice Blackmun's law
clerk summarizing the reactions within the other chambers to the Scalia
opinion, however, the rest of the Court did not follow suit.' 6 Brennan
still believed that there was no taking and the case should be remanded
162. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice John Paul Stevens, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Nov.
io, 1986) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
163. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Feb. 20, 1986) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Oct. 8, 1986) (The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 2).
167. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Mar. 9, 1986) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
168. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Antonin Scalia, Hodel, No. 85-687
(Mar. 3, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Justice
Antonin Scalia, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Feb. 26, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
169. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Mar. 9, 1987) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
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for consideration of the due process issue raised by Stevens.7 ' White had
assigned the case to Stevens, but still had not even himself signed on to
the Stevens draft opinion for the Court.'7' Marshall's clerks reported that
Marshall "wants the Indians to win and doesn't think he will join Justice
Scalia's opinion.' ' 72 The Blackmun clerk also wrote to the Justice that
"Justice O'Connor's clerk is very uncomfortable with Justice Scalia's
opinion, but [O'Connor's clerk] doesn't think that she wants to write.'
73
The logjam was finally broken in mid-March when Justice O'Connor
circulated her own draft concurring opinion that found a taking relying
on a Penn Central balancing analysis.' 74 By the end of April, O'Connor
was circulating the draft as an opinion for the Court, which she described
in correspondence with the other chambers as "the result of efforts to
seek a compromise between Nino's approach and the approach in my
dissent."'75 After O'Connor acquiesced in Scalia's request that she
eliminate from her draft language distinguishing Andrus v. Allard 76 and
Brennan decided, notwithstanding that revision, 77 to join the majority
opinion, the disassembling of Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court was
complete. Justice Stevens was left to file his opinion relying on due
process as a separate concurring opinion, which only Justice White
joined, 78 perhaps just out of courtesy given that White had plainly erred
in originally assigning Stevens the opinion for the Court.
In all events, Justice Scalia stalled in his first effort, literally out of
the box, to begin to move the Court to promote property rights more
aggressively. Notwithstanding the plaudits he received from
commentators for his opening day performance at oral argument, he had
little to show for it the day the Court actually announced its opinion. The




174. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Mar. 12, 1987) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("This is it! I was hoping that if we waited long enough there would
be an opinion that I could recommend that you join -Justice O'Connor has found a taking by applying
the traditional balancing test.").
175. Sandra Day O'Connor, Memorandum to the Conference, Hodel, No. 85-687 (Apr. 21, 1987)
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
176. Sandra Day O'Connor, Memorandum to the Conference, Hodel, No. 85-687 (May 5, 1987)
(The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
177. Letter from Justice William H. Brennan to Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, Hodel, No. 85-687
(May 8, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("I regret having to prolong the agony in the
above, but I am uncomfortable with the case as it now stands. Your decision to delete any discussion
of Allard, standing by itself, was not troublesome for me. Viewed in tandem with Nino's concurrence,
however, the practical result is to limit Allard to its facts."). Justice Brennan ultimately joined
Blackmun's majority opinion and wrote his own short concurring opinion taking issue with Scalia's
reading of the impact of Hodel on Allard. See Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704, 718 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
concurring).
178. 481 U.S. at 719.
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standing issue he trumpeted with great fanfare at oral argument proved
to have no legs, as no one, including even Scalia, subsequently embraced
the concerns he had expressed in October in any of the actual written
opinions.'79 And, Scalia failed in his efforts to use Hodel v. Irving as an
effective vehicle to declare a bright line takings test more favorable to
property owners than he considered the Penn Central multi-factor
balancing framework. When the dust settled, Justice O'Connor, not
Justice Scalia, proved the more effective in crafting an opinion for the
Court. '"
2. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis (1987)'8'
The Court heard oral argument in Keystone Bituminous in
November, little more than a month after oral argument in Hodel v.
Irving, and just after it was becoming clear that Justice Stevens lacked a
majority for his draft opinion relying on due process in that case. The
case was strikingly reminiscent of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon,"2 the
fountainhead of the Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence. Both
Keystone Bituminous and Pennsylvania Coal involved regulatory takings
challenges to restrictions on coal mining in Pennsylvania that were
designed to limit the adverse public safety consequences of such mining
due to surface subsidence. Both restrictions had the necessary
consequence of limiting the mineral estate's ability to mine coal and
benefiting the competing owner of the surface estate whose rights were
otherwise by private contact subservient to the mineral estate. In
Pennsylvania Coal, a closely divided Court struck down the mining
restriction as an unconstitutional taking. But, in Keystone Bituminous, a
closely divided Court upheld the state law in the context of a facial
takings challenge. Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun."" Chief Justice
Rehnquist dissented, joined by Justices Powell, O'Connor, and Scalia.' 4
Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court relied on an extremely narrow
reading of the Pennsylvania Coal precedent, treating as mere dicta much
of Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court in that case.
Unlike Hodel v. Irving, the final opinions in Keystone Bituminous
were not the result of shifting votes. The final votes in the case were
identical to the initial votes in conference for each of the Justices.
85
179. See id. at 704-34.
I8o. In the aftermath of the Court's decision in Hodel v. Irving, Congress amended section 207 of
the Indian Land Consolidation Act, but the Court subsequently invalidated the amended law as well
on takings grounds. See Babbitt v. Youpee, 519 U.S. 234, 237 (997).
i81. 480 U.S. 470 (1987).
182. 260 U.S. 393 0922).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 506.
185. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Keystone Bituminous Coal, No. 85-1092 (Nov. 14,
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According to Blackmun's conference notes, the Chief acknowledged that
one's approach to the case "depends on the point of view" because one
could characterize the case either as merely a "9%" deprivation or a
deprivation of the right to mine 27 million tons of coal.'8 For Rehnquist,
however, Pennsylvania Coal was controlling. Justice White was clearly
the swing Justice on the Court for the case and while he voted at
conference in favor of upholding the law, he also indicated that his view
was tentative and he was "not fully at rest."'"" He seemed to distinguish
Pennsylvania Coal on the ground that in the days of "John W. Davis"
(the counsel for the coal company in 1922), one "could not mine" but in
light of new technology one "can mine."' 8 White apparently closed his
comments by saying that he would now vote to affirm the lower court's
rejection of the takings claim, but that he would also wait and read the
dissent in the case before finally voting.' 89 Justice Scalia, as the junior
Justice, spoke last and bluntly explained the reasons for voting to strike
down the state law. He characterized Pennsylvania Coal as an "anchor"
and the state law challenged in this case as "less a regulation than a rip-
off. [It] gives economic wealth to the surface owner."'
As the senior Justice in the majority, Justice Brennan in mid-
November assigned Justice Stevens the responsibility of drafting the
opinion for the Court. 9 ' Stevens circulated in mid-February what
Blackmun's clerk described as a "lengthy" draft that reflected a "lack of
editing,' 92 and Rehnquist circulated his dissent soon thereafter. Because
the final versions of both were published less than a month later, on
March 9, I987, the kind of internal struggle then occurring over Hodel v.
Irving was apparently not repeated in Keystone Bituminous. Justice
Blackmun's clerk did express, in a memorandum, some misgivings about
the "length and lack of editing" of Stevens' draft majority opinion and
"more serious[ly]" the possibility that "Justice White [who] was on the
fence in this case... may react adversely to such a lengthy opinion. '
But those fears were not realized. Whatever opening the Keystone
Bituminous dissenters had to bring Justice White over to their side was
not successfully exploited.
The upshot was, in retrospect, the Court's publication in Keystone
Bituminous of a most unlikely repudiation of Pennsylvania Coal given






I9i. Docket Sheet, Keystone Bituminous Coal, No. 85-1092 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
192. Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Keystone Bituminous Coal, No. 85-to92
(Feb. I I, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
193. Id.
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the makeup of the Court at the time. Hence, while Justice Scalia and
others were fighting over Hodel v. Irving, Justice Stevens had succeeded
in persuading Justice White to join a potentially far more significant
opinion in Keystone Bituminous, which preempted the Hodel v. Irving
decision by two months. The only saving grace for the property rights
movement was that it was hard to believe that there was in fact a stable
majority on the Court for everything within Stevens' opinion for
Keystone Bituminous. But, for Justice Stevens, who had lost his Court in
Hodel v. Irving, Keystone Bituminous was a major accomplishment.
3. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale
v. County of Los Angeles (I987)"9
In First English, the Court finally had the opportunity a majority of
the Court had long sought to address-the regulatory takings remedy
issue first raised, but not reached, in Agins and then again in San Diego
Gas & Electric. No doubt for this reason, all nine Justices voted at
conference to note probable jurisdiction and to hear the case on the
merits.'95 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion for the
Court in First English, essentially embracing Justice Brennan's dissenting
opinion in favor of the property owners in San Diego Gas & Electric,
elevating that opinion to the status of an opinion of the Court.',9 The
First English Court ruled that because the Constitution by its own terms
mandated the payment of "just compensation" for governmental takings
of private property, when a government regulation was deemed a taking,
the government had a choice: the government could either purchase the
property by paying "just compensation," or the government could lift the
offending regulation and pay "just compensation" for the temporary
taking that occurred prior to the regulation's invalidation."
The Court's opinion did, however, contain one surprise. Justice
O'Connor did not join the Chief's opinion, which was instead joined by
Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and (not surprisingly) Scalia.
Justice O'Connor, like Justice Blackmun, joined parts of Justice Stevens'
dissent.' 98 The parts joined by O'Connor (and Blackmun) dissented on
two grounds. The first was that there was clearly no regulatory taking in
the case, and therefore, the case should have been dismissed on summary
judgment, obviating any need to address the remedy issue. 99 The second
ground was that the judgment should have been affirmed because the
majority was agreeing with the state (California) courts that government
194. 482 U.S. 304 (1987).
195. Docket Sheet, First English, No. 85-1 i99 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
196. Compare First English, 482 U.S. at 314-22, with San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San
Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 646-61 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197. 482 U.S. at 314-22.
t98. Id. at 322.
199. Id. at 323-28.
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could invalidate the regulation without having to purchase the property
and the state courts had not yet reached the question of possible
damages for a temporary taking."° Neither O'Connor nor Blackmun
joined the portions of Stevens' dissent that contended that due process
rather than takings should govern the kind of claims at issue in First
English, alleging "improperly motivated, unfairly conducted, or
unnecessarily protracted governmental decisionmaking.....
The Blackmun Papers are revealing both because they cast further
light on the views of several of the Justices, including the Chief,
O'Connor, and Scalia. The conference notes, for instance, show that
Chief Justice Rehnquist did not believe that the interim land use
ordinance at issue in the case, which restricted reconstruction of a church
retreat center and camp for handicapped children in a flood plain
following its prior destruction by flood, amounted to a taking."2 The
Chief Justice began the discussion of the case by stating that he "fe[lt] no
taking here," but went on to explain why he also believed the Court
could, as a matter of procedure, address the remedy issue while
sidestepping the merits." Blackmun, alone, favored dismissing the case,
with everyone else agreeing with the Chief that the remedy issue was
properly before the Court, while not necessarily agreeing that reversal
was warranted.2"
Justice O'Connor argued in favor of affirmance, consistent with her
subsequent vote to join Justice Stevens' dissent in part."0 The tenor of
her comments was apparently quite emotional. She described the
consequences of the case as "grave" while also stating that "this
particular restriction is not a taking. '2°6 She also stated that she "share[d]
Stevens' concerns about the interim" just after Stevens had informed the
conference that there "need not be compensation for temporary taking"
and any damages appropriate for such a temporary deprivation should be
governed by a "higher standard" best left for the lower courts to consider
in the first instance."° But in one of the more remarkable points in all of
the Blackmun Paper conference notes that I reviewed, Blackmun then
reports that O'Connor said, "This is scary and I rise in alarm! ' In
apparently characterizing the tenor of her comments, Blackmun writes
200. Id. at 335-39.
201. Id. at 339-41.
202. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, First English, No. 85-II99 (Jan. 16,j987) (The
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"very 9" and "screams."2"
While far less dramatic, even more surprising is that Justice Scalia at
conference voted with O'Connor and Stevens to affirm and therefore
was not in the majority." ° According to Blackmun's conference notes,
Scalia contended that the interim period did not amount to a taking,
while also saying that he would not "go so far as the Solicitor General"
(who argued broadly against a constitutionally compelled just
compensation remedy) because that argument was "a disaster!""' Scalia
said, like Stevens, that while "not a taking," such a temporary
impairment "could be a deprivation of due process ....
What the conference notes therefore reveal is that Justice Scalia was
far from fully on board the property rights movement in all respects
during his first term. Whether the Just Compensation Clause mandated a
remedy of "just compensation" in damages for regulatory takings was a
central element of the movement's constitutional claims. Yet, when first
considering it, Scalia's reaction was to reject it. Scalia's reluctance was
not, moreover, confined to the conference. The Chief Justice circulated
his draft opinion in mid-February,"3 one month after the January 1987
conference, and he quickly obtained his Court. Justices Powell, Brennan,
White, and Marshall all had joined his opinion for the Court within a few
days."4 By contrast, Justice Scalia did not join the Chief Justice's opinion
until more than three months later, on May 28, 1987, a few weeks after
Justice Stevens circulated his dissent, which Blackmun and O'Connor
joined in part."5
209. Id. As previously described, a recent biography of Justice O'Connor suggests that Justice
Blackmun was especially hostile to O'Connor, prone to denigrating her abilities, which may explain his
tendency to describe her on this occasion and on others as merely emotional rather than analytical. See
supra note 120. In other words, Blackmun's description may be more revealing about Blackmun than
about O'Connor.
21o. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, First English, No. 85-I199 (Jan. 16,987) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First
English, No. 85-1199 (Feb. i9, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
214. See Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First
English, No. 85-is99 (Feb. i9, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Justice
William J. Brennan Jr. to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First English, No. 85-1199 (Feb. 20,
1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter from Byron R. White to Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist, First English, No. 85-I199 (Feb. 23, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Letter
from Thurgood Marshall to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First English, No. 85-1199 (Feb. 24,
1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
215. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, First English, No.
85-199 (May 28, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); see Justice Stevens, iST Draft Dissent,
First English, No. 85-i199 (May 6, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); First English




The Blackmun Papers do not offer any hints as to the cause of
Justice Scalia's change of heart. What seems most likely, however, is that
by May of that Term, the ideological dividing lines were beginning to
form around the regulatory taking issue and Justice Scalia chose a side,
not content to straddle the issue like either Justice White or Justice
O'Connor. If that is so, the likely trigger for Scalia's decision to embrace
the property rights issue may well have been the final regulatory takings
case of the Term, Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,"' which was
the first property rights case opinion for the Court authored by Scalia,
discussed next.
4. Nollan v. California Coastal Commission (1987)"7
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission was the Court's final
regulatory takings case of October Term 1986, argued on March 30,
1987."' Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, which was not
handed down until the last opinion day of the Term, June 26, 1987."19 The
ruling was a significant win for property rights advocates, and especially
welcome after their disappointing loss a few weeks before in Keystone
Bituminous. Indeed, it was hard to square the reasoning of Keystone
Bituminous with Nollan. Justice White, alone, was in the majority in the
two cases and he wrote in neither one.
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nollan upheld a takings
claim brought against the California Coastal Commission.' The
Commission policy challenged by homeowners in the case allowed for
the lifting of height restrictions on development along the Pacific coast in
exchange for the landowner agreeing to provide the public with lateral
access along the beach between the home and the ocean that was
otherwise private property.22 2 The Court ruled that although the outright
taking of a permanent public access requirement would be a per se
taking, a permit condition requiring such access could pass constitutional
muster if the condition substantially furthered the same governmental
purposes as would have justified denial of the permit. 3
216. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
217. Id.
218. U.S. Supreme Court Center, Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, http://www.justia.us/us/483/825/
index.html (last visited Jan. 29, 2006).
219. Id.
220. Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 48o U.S. 470, 472 (1987); Nollan, 483 U.S.
at 826. The Court decided to hear Nollan apparently only after Justice Scalia requested that the case
be relisted after initial conference. See Docket Sheet, Nollan, No. 86-133 (The Blackmun Papers, supra
note 2). Ultimately, Justices Scalia, O'Connor, and Powell voted to hear the case, which fell shy of the
requisite four votes for review, except that both the Chief Justice and Justice White stated their
willingness to "join 3" to supply the necessary vote for plenary review. See id.
221. 483 U.S. at 841-42.
222. Id. at 828.
223. Id. at 836-37.
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According to the majority, the constitutional flaw in Nollan was the
absence of a sufficient nexus between the government interests being
served by the height restriction and those being served by the exaction of
public access to the beach.224 The Court found unpersuasive the
Commission's claim that both the restriction and the exaction furthered
the public interest in beach access, with the height restriction focusing on
the public's visual access and the exaction providing instead for the
public's physical access. 5 In addition to Justice White, the Chief Justice,
Justice Powell and Justice O'Connor provided Justice Scalia's opinion
,,6with the necessary majority. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion,
which Justice Marshall joined. 7 Justice Blackmun filed his own
dissenting opinion"s as did Justice Stevens, though the latter's primary
purpose was to chide Justice Brennan yet one more time for joining the
majority's opinion in First English.229
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court contained several elaborations
especially promising to property rights advocates. First, the opinion
rejected the government's argument that the fact that the landowners
purchased the property after the Coastal Commission announced its
policy defeated their takings claim, because they had notice and
therefore no reasonable investment backed expectations to the contrary.
The majority ruled that the government, simply by giving prior notice,
could not so easily defeat an otherwise meritorious takings claim. 3 The
Court also rejected the argument that mere rational basis means-end
review was all that was required in takings analysis, akin to due process
and equal protection analysis. Relying on the Court's prior language in
Agins to conclude that the regulation must "'substantially advance' the
'legitimate state interest' to be achieved," the Court held that the
exaction's substantive nexus to the purposes being served by the
underlying development restriction must accordingly be more
substantial. 3'
The Blackmun Papers for the Nollan case provide insight into the
224. Id. at 837.
225. Id. at 838.
226. Id. at 826.
227. Id. at 842 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
228. Id. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
229. See id. at 866-67 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
I like the hat that Justice Brennan has donned today better than the one he wore in San
Diego, and I am persuaded that he has the better of the legal arguments here. Even if his
position prevailed in this case, however, it would be of little solace to land-use planners who
would still be left guessing about how the Court will react to the next case, and the one after
that. As this case demonstrates, the rule of liability created by the Court in First English is a
shortsighted one. Like Justice Brennan, I hope that "a broader vision ultimately prevails."
Id. at 867.
230. Id. at 833 n.2.
231. Id. at 834 n.3 (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260--62 (i98o)).
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Court's deliberations. At conference, for instance, Justice Brennan
described the case as "tough" and appears to have indicated that he
might be voting for reversal (in favor of the landowner) before finally
settling on affirmance in favor of the Coastal Commission."' Blackmun
describes Brennan as having talked for a "long" time. 33 Justice Marshall
at conference formally voted in favor of the landowner, saying matter of
factly that the "State has a right to take but must pay. Simple." '34 Later,
however, when the draft opinions were circulating, Marshall ended up
switching positions and voting with Brennan in dissent.3
The most surprising part of Blackmun's conference notes is the
suggestion that Scalia originally thought the challenged Coastal
Commission exaction policy was "not a regulatory taking. ' ' 3' To be sure,
the conference notes show Scalia voting for reversal in favor of the
landowner, but not on takings grounds. 37 Justice Scalia reportedly
described the state beach access exaction policy as "a gimmick."23' He
also contended that there "has to be a reasonable relationship" and that
there should be "no balancing test."'39 His antipathy for a balancing test
in Nollan is consistent with his view then being expressed during the
Court's simultaneous deliberations in Hodel v. Irving, in which he
proffered a bright line takings test rather than a Penn Central multi-
factor analytical framework. 4
As is evident from the final opinion for the Court authored by
Scalia, the Justice at some point between the date of the conference
(April I, 1987) and the final opinion he drafted for the Court decided to
embrace the takings approach to the case. What is interesting is that in
neither First English, described above, nor in Nollan, did Scalia initially
believe it made sense to characterize the relevant constitutional problem
as a "taking." He instead appears to have thought that the issue sounded
more in due process than in takings. In both Nollan and First English,
however, Scalia decided to embrace the takings approach fairly
enthusiastically. He might have done so because he in fact changed his
own mind in both cases, which would also explain why he finally decided
in late May to join the Chief Justice's opinion for the Court in First
English. Or, perhaps, Justice Scalia decided that as the author of the
232. See Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Nollan, No. 86-133 (Apr. I, 1987) (The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 2).
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Nollan, 483 U.S. at 842.
236. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Nollan, No. 86-133 (Apr. s, 1987) (The Blackmun




240. See infra text accompanying notes 163-64.
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opinion for the Court in Nollan, it was his responsibility to reflect the
views of the majority of the Justices, which relied on a takings label,
rather than on whatever constitutional label he might have thought more
apt were this a constitutional question of first impression. 4'
5. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council (1992)242
When Justice Clarence Thomas joined the Court in 1992, the
property rights movement had good reason to believe that the Court
finally had a firm majority favorable to their interests. Justice Thomas
had given speeches in the past that endorsed more aggressive protection
of property rights under the federal Constitution. Indeed, for that reason,
the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Joseph Biden,
commenced Justice Thomas' confirmation hearings by questioning then-
Judge Thomas about his views on property rights and the possible impact
of those views on the ability of government to regulate private
property.243
Soon after his confirmation, moreover, the Court seemed ready to
do just what property rights advocates had hoped and government
regulators had feared. Within the first few weeks of October Term 199i,
the Court granted review in three different property rights cases raising
the regulatory taking issue: PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez,2" Yee v.
241. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Nollan does not, in any event, represent his finest
work of opinion craftsmanship. This was the end of Scalia's first Term on the Court, and during the
final few weeks it was quite clear that he was behind in his opinion assignments and having difficulty
completing all of his work by the close of the Term. He filed four opinions for the Court during the
final two days of the Term. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (filed on June 26, 1987);
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (filed on June 26, 1987); Anderson v. Creighton,
483 U.S. 635 (1987) (filed on June 25, 1987); U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987) (filed on June 25,
1987).
He also filed two additional opinions for the Court earlier in June. See Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S.
755 (1987) (filed on June i9, 1987); Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Bd. of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482
U.S. 270 (1987) (filed on June 8, 1987). And, during the last two weeks of the Term, he also filed five
dissenting opinions. See Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (filed on
June 24, 1987); Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (filed
on June 23, 1987); Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987)
(Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (filed June 23, 1987); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 61o (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (filed on June i9, 1987); Booth v. Maryland, 482 U.S. 496,
519 (198 7 ) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (filed on June 15, 1987).
The Nollan opinion, in particular, was oddly drafted. Unlike most majority opinions, which seem
clearly to have been written before the circulation of any dissenting opinions, Scalia's opinion for the
Court in Nollan makes almost all of its substantive points in lengthy response to Justice Brennan's
dissent. Its peculiar nature may be why, in a memorandum to the Justice about the case, one of
Blackmun's clerks wrote that "Justice Scalia's opinion for the majority might as well carry a disclaimer
that the Court does its sloppiest work at the end of the year." Letter from Law Clerk to Harry A.
Blackmun, Noiian, No. 86-133 (June 9, 1987) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
242. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
243. See Nomination of Judge Clarence Thomas To Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, I02d Cong. 110-27 (99I).
244. 502 U.S. 956 (i99i).
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City of Escondido,"45 and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council. 6 The
first two cases, however, largely fizzled when the Court, upon closer
examination, realized that the constitutional issues were not well
presented. The Court formally dismissed the writ as improvidently
granted in PFZ Properties," and, while reaching the merits by rejecting
other constitutional claims in Yee, concluded that the regulatory taking
issue was not fairly presented by the case and accordingly declined to
address it.248
Lucas was therefore the only one of the three regulatory takings
cases to survive the Term intact. The facts of the case, as presented to the
Court, seemed very sympathetic to the landowner, David Lucas, and for
this reason, it is not surprising to learn that the members of the Court
who voted to hear the case (the Chief Justice and Justices White,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas) were those most interested in
establishing precedent favorable to property rights. 49 The state law Lucas
challenged prevented him from building a house (or any other
permanent structure) on either of his two beachfront lots, even though
houses had previously been built up and down the coastline on similarly
situated property before the new development restrictions became
effective.25 The trial court had found that the new development
restrictions had rendered the property without any economic value and
therefore constituted a taking, but the South Carolina Supreme Court
had reversed, seemingly on little more than the fact that the restriction
was a valid police power measure that furthered legitimate governmental
interests.
When Justice Scalia announced the opinion for the Court in Lucas
on the very last day of the Term in June, the ruling seemed to many to be
the blockbuster for which the property rights movement had long hoped.
Justice Scalia wrote, as he tends to do, with a fair amount of gusto, on
this occasion stressing the important "historical compact recorded in the
Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture.. 5.
The Court opinion immediately made clear that, notwithstanding the
Stevens' opinion for the Court five years earlier in Keystone Bituminous,
Pennsylvania Coal remained good law. 53 The opinion also, notably, at
245. 502 U.S. 905 (1991).
246. 502 U.S. 966 (I99i).
247. PFZ Properties, Inc. v. Rodriguez, 503 U.S. 257 (1992).
248. Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532-33 (1992).
249. Docket Sheet, Lucas, No. 91-453 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). Justice Blackmun,
however, also stated at conference his willingness to supply the fourth vote for jurisdiction, if
necessary to grant review. Id.
25o. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, ioo8-o9 (1992).
251. Id. at Ioo9-Io.
252. Id. at 1028.
253. Id. at 1oi4-15. The opinion noted, cryptically, that Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v.
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the outset of its analysis cited to a law review article written by
University of Chicago law professor Richard Epstein, widely considered
the intellectual fountainhead of the property rights movement.54
Somewhat reminiscent of his unsuccessful draft opinion for the
Court five years earlier in Hodel v. Irving, Justice Scalia's opinion for the
Court in Lucas sought to eschew a Penn Central balancing approach in
favor of a bright line test. 5 In particular, the Lucas opinion carved out of
the Court's prior precedent a series of per se takings tests. For example,
relying on Agins v. City of Tiburon, the Court held that a police power
regulation that deprived a landowner of all "economically viable use" of
the property constituted a taking.56 Scalia's Lucas opinion also offered a
not-so-subtle rebuke of Andrus v. Allard, the case he sought to limit to
its fact in Hodel v. Irving, in particular its reference to "profits" as being
a "slender reed" upon which to base a takings claim. The Lucas opinion,
by contrast proclaimed "'[Flor what is the land but the profits
thereof[?]'"257
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's attempt in Lucas to move the Court
to a bright line test, his opinion for the Court included a series of caveats
that deprived the holding of some of its force. One footnote expressly
admitted just that. It acknowledged that "[riegrettably, the rhetorical
force of our 'deprivation of all economically feasible use' rule is greater
than its precision, since the rule does not make clear the ' property
interest' against which the loss of value is to be measured." 5 In that
footnote, the opinion sought to cast some doubt on the ongoing validity
of the Court's prior ruling in Penn Central that, in evaluating a takings
claim, one looked to the "property as a whole" rather than the part most
restricted by regulation. 59 The Court's holding was also further muddled
by the fact that the apparent critical trigger for the per se test-loss of all
economically viable use-was alternatively phrased throughout the
opinion, making even less clear what the trigger was in terms of the
extent of remaining economic value, if any.26o
The most significant limitation within the opinion, however, was the
majority's concession that there was an exception from the per se test for
DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 472 (1987), had rejected a takings challenge to a state law "nearly
identical" to the one struck down in Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 138 n.36
(1978). Lucas, 505 U.S. at ioi6 n.7 (citations omitted).
254. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
255. Id.
256. Id. at ios6.
257. Id. at 1017 (quoting I E. COKE, INSTITUTES ch. I, § I (ist Am. ed. 1812)).
258. Id. at io16 n.7.
259. See id.
260. The Lucas opinion alternatively referred to the per se trigger as the absence of economically
"beneficial," "productive," "feasible" use, leaving the property "economically idle," or without
"economic value." See id. at 1015-20, 1034.
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regulations that did no more than apply "background principles" of law,
including nuisance law:
Any limitation so severe cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation), but must inhere in the title itself, in the
restrictions that background principles of the State's law of property
and nuisance already place upon land ownership. A law or decree with
such an effect must, in other words, do no more than duplicate the
result that could have been achieved in the courts-by adjacent
landowners (or other uniquely affected persons) under the State's law
of private nuisance, or by the State under its complementary power to
abate nuisances that affect the public generally, or otherwise.
The majority elaborated that there would, under this formulation be
no liability "for the destruction of 'real and personal property, in cases of
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall other
grave threats to the lives and property of others.'262 Nor would the owner
of a lake bed
be entitled to compensation when he is denied the requisite permit to
engage in a landfilling operation that would have the effect of flooding
others' land. Nor the corporate owner of a nuclear generating plant,
when it is directed to remove all improvements from its land upon
discovery that the plant sits astride an earthquake fault.
6
,
The Lucas Court explained that while "[s]uch regulatory action may well
have the effect of eliminating the land's only economically productive
use,... it does not proscribe a productive use that was previously
permissible under relevant property and nuisance principles."'264 The
majority opinion went on to cite to the Second Restatement of Torts
provisions governing nuisance law. ' 65 Because the Restatement is very
open-ended in its potential reach and ultimately relies on a balancing
test, this final acknowledgment dramatically undermined the significance
of the supposedly per se approach that the Lucas majority opinion had
announced a few paragraphs earlier.
Because of the background principles and nuisance exception, the
Lucas Court stopped short of formally ruling that the restriction on land
use development in that case was a taking.2s The Court instead
remanded back to the state courts to determine in the first instances what
the applicable principles of state law were, including state nuisance law.
67
While thereby deferring to the state courts on a question of state law, the
majority opinion left little doubt whether it believed those principles
261. Id. at 1029.
262. Id. at 1029 n.16.
263. Id. at 1029.
264. Id. at io29-3o.
265. Id. at o3I.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1031-32.
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could validly bar the landowner in Lucas from building his houses on his
two lots. The Court added "[i]t seems unlikely that common-law
principles would have prevented the erection of any habitable or
productive improvements on petitioner's land; they rarely support
prohibition of the 'essential use' of land. ' '26 The Court also warned that
states were not unfettered in their ability to announce "background
principles" of state law capable of defeating a per se takings claim.2
69
"[O]nly if an objectively reasonable application of relevant precedents
would exclude those beneficial uses in the circumstances in which the
land is presently found" would a per se taking not be found. 7
The Chief Justice and Justices White, O'Connor, and Thomas joined
Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court.27 ' Justice Kennedy concurred in the
judgment only, adopting a very different analytical framework than that
proffered by Scalia for the Court. 72 Kennedy advanced a "reasonable
expectations" analysis and, seemingly in direct contradiction of the
majority opinion, further contended that "[t]he common law of nuisance
is too narrow a confine for the exercise of regulatory power in a complex
and interdependent society." '73 Explicitly recognizing the basis of much
modern environmental law, Kennedy added that "[c]oastal property may
present such unique concerns for a fragile land system that the State can
go further in regulating its development and use than the common law of
nuisance might otherwise permit." '74 Justice Souter neither concurred nor
dissented. He filed a separate "statement" in which he contended that
the Court should have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted in
part because of the improbable nature of the district court's finding that
the property that was the subject of the takings claim truly had no
remaining economic value. 75
Much speculation surrounded the Court's opinion immediately
afterwards. The way it was written, for instance, suggested the possibility
that Scalia was working hard to hold on to his majority. 76 That would
explain why the opinion would announce a per se test in sweeping terms,
but then just as quickly abandon it with caveats such as nuisance law that
seemed to reintroduce into the takings analysis the very kind of
balancing test and harm/benefit analysis that the opinion purported to be
rejecting. There was also reason to wonder why and how two relatively
268. Id. at 103i (quoting Curtin v. Benson, 222 U.S. 78,86 (1911)).
269. Id.
270. Id. at 1032 n.18.
271. Id. at IOO5.
272. Id. at 1032.
273. Id. at 1034-35.
274. Id. at 1035.
275. Id. at lo76 (Souter, J.).
276. See, e.g., Lazarus, Counting Votes, supra note 45, at i i8-i9; Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the
Correct "Spin" on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1426-27 (1993).
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new Justices, Kennedy and Souter, had nonetheless failed to join the
majority. Justice White was, as in October Term 1986, the decisive fifth
vote.
The Blackmun Papers here too tell a much fuller and richer story. At
conference, the vote in favor of the landowner was not nearly as close or
as divided as suggested by the final Court opinion. The conference vote
had seven Justices in the majority and only two (Blackmun and Stevens)
in dissent.77 In addition to the four members of the Court who ended up
joining Scalia's final opinion for the Court, Justices Kennedy and Souter
also voted for the landowner, without much qualification."' Justice
Kennedy asserted that he was "[with the Chief Justice]." '79 The Chief had
previously commented during conference deliberations that "this type of
[regulation] is not [sufficient] to bring [in the] nuisance line of cases" and
that a claim was "[available] in terms of [the] just [compensation] cases,
i.e., Penn Central."''  Kennedy added that one "cannot write narrowly"
and that the "Agins [language] is not correct and has [to be]
explained." '' In similarly voting for reversal, Justice Souter stated that
"the [State] [Supreme Court] rule is wrong" and the case provided an
opportunity "to begin to explain what we mean by a nuisance.""' Finally,
Justice O'Connor stated at conference that this is a "very [important]
case" and, while voting for the landowner, also added that "there is a
public nuisance exception. '""3 According to O'Connor, the "[State] has to
do [more]" to justify its development restriction4
Although the case was argued on March 2, Justice Scalia did not
circulate his draft opinion until early June,8 5 three months later, leaving
277. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Lucas, No. 91-453 (Mar. 4, 1992) (The Blackmun








285. Docket Sheet, Lucas, No. 91-453 (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2); Antonin Scalia, First
Draft Majority Opinion, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June [ ], 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
Justice O'Connor quickly joined the majority opinion in what she dubbed "this difficult case," while
expressing some concern that his draft shifts the "burden of persuasion... to the state." Letter from
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Antonin Scalia, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June 2, 1992) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). The Chief Justice joined the next day, while also asking Justice Scalia
to "accommodate two relatively minor suggestions," including a more expanded discussion of the
"'noxious use' line of cases" and an explicit reservation "with respect to the authority of government
to destroy or damage property during the course of battle, or in some other comparable emergency,
without having to pay compensat;Dn." Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice
Antonin Scalia, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June 3, 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
The final Court opinion reflects both these suggestions. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505
U.S. 1003, 1022-23 (1992) ("It is correct that many of our prior opinions have suggested that 'harmful
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relatively little time for further internal deliberations before the Court
adjourned at the end of that same month. The Blackmun Papers contain
little formal correspondence between chambers but the correspondence
that does exist, along with the conference notes, suggest why and how
Justice Scalia may have lost his seven-Justice majority. Justice Scalia's
per se approach pushed Justice Kennedy away, as it did Justice Souter,
both of whom would have likely joined an opinion that pursued
something more akin to the Penn Central balancing approach mentioned
by the Chief Justice during conference. Scalia's inclusion, on the other
hand, of the extended discussion of background principles and nuisance
law seems likely to have been in response to Justice O'Connor, who
mentioned the need for a nuisance exception at conference.' 86 The
majority opinion's explicit acknowledgment that restricting development
in a flood hazard area would not be a taking also seems to have been
directed to O'Connor's reported "alarm," emotionally expressed several
years back during the First English conference, that it was not a taking to
bar the reconstruction of a camp for handicapped children in a
floodplain.28 As late as three days before the final opinion was
announced, Justice O'Connor was still writing Scalia about possible
concerns with parts of the opinion2 8
In sum, there was a cost to Justice Scalia's decision to craft the
majority opinion in a more aggressive way. He lost the votes of two of
the newer (and more junior) Justices on the Court, both of whom had
expressed a willingness to join a majority opinion in favor of the
or noxious uses' of property may be proscribed by government regulation without the requirement of
compensation. For a number of reasons, however, we think the South Carolina Supreme Court was
too quick to conclude that that principle decides the present case."); id. at 1029 n.16 ("absolving the
State (or private parties) of liability for the destruction of 'real and personal property, in cases of
actual necessity, to prevent the spreading of a fire' or to forestall other grave threats to the lives and
property of others").
286. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Lucas, No. 91-453 (Mar. 4, 1992) (The Blackmun
Papers, supra note 2).
287. See supra text accompanying notes 205-09. During oral argument in First English, Justice
O'Connor expressed her concern about allowing construction in a flood hazard area. See Official
Transcript Proceedings Before the Supreme Court of the United States at 26, First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987) (No. 85-1199) (questions
posed by Justice O'Connor) ("[D]o you think that local governments don't have authority to engage in
flood control regulation? ... And does the church plan to rebuild on a flood plain where people have
been killed?").
288. Letter from Justice Sandra Day O'Connor to Justice Antonin Scalia, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June
26, 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("I notice that the second draft of Lucas now says, at
page i i, note 6, that Penn Central was 'unsupportable.' I hope you will consider taking this out, as I
am not prepared to disapprove of Penn Central as part of the resolution of this case. If you do not
decide to remove it, please show me as joining all but note 6."); Letter from Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor to Justice Antonin Scalia, Lucas, No. 91-453 (June 26, 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra
note 2) ("At your suggestion, I have reread note 6 and I now accept your explanation that the criticism




landowner. The opinion instead relied on the vote, never fully explained
by any of the papers, of Justice White, the oldest member of the Court by
far and, accordingly, the most likely to leave the Court soon thereafter.
In fact, Justice White resigned from the Court one year later, which
immediately raised legitimate questions concerning the continuing
vitality of Lucas.
Even more importantly, whatever short term advantages might have
been realized by the per se approach, Justice O'Connor's apparent
insistence on a lengthy discussion of nuisance law, including the nuisance
balancing test, seems to have rendered any such advantages no more
than a Pyrrhic victory. The Lucas per se test was so narrowly drawn that,
as established by subsequent case law, it almost never applies. The
practical effect of its inapplicability is, ironically, to make lower courts
less rather than more likely to find that a challenged regulation amounts
to a regulatory taking.f The natural tendency of courts is to ask, first,
whether a regulation constitutes a per se taking under Lucas and, after
concluding that it does not, to conclude quickly that the regulation is
constitutional. In the Lucas per se world, the Penn Central analysis
became a mere afterthought, akin to a rational basis review that lower
courts equated with a finding of constitutionality.
Had, by contrast, Justice Scalia been willing to embrace the kind of
reasonable expectations analysis favored by Kennedy that Scalia abhors,
the resulting precedent might well have proved more powerful and
longstanding. Lower courts might well have taken note of the Court's
willingness to use a balancing test to find a regulation to be an
unconstitutional taking. And, following that lead, those same courts
would likely have been more willing to do the same rather than to treat
balancing approaches as necessarily toothless. Certainly, in other areas of
law, ranging from abortion rights to the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination, conservative jurists have substantially
furthered their agenda through incremental decisionmaking that, while
less sweeping than overruling Roe v. Wade"9 or Miranda v. Arizona,29 '
use balancing tests in support of their preferred substantive outcome. In
this manner, both a woman's right to obtain an abortion and a criminal
defendant's ability to rely on her Fifth Amendment right against self-
289. See Michael C. Blumm & Lucus Ritchie, Lucas's Unlikely Legacy: The Rise of Background
Principles as Categorical Takings Defenses, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 321 (2005). Soon after Lucas was
decided, I suggested the possibility of just this unintended result. See Lazarus, Putting the Correct
"Spin" on Lucas, supra note 276, at 1427 ("But, because environmental protection laws almost never
result in total economic deprivations, that categorical presumption will rarely apply. Instead, the
negative implication of the category's nonapplicability will dominate the lower courts' takings
analyses. These courts will likely apply the opposite presumption that no taking has occurred.").
290. 410 U.S. 113 (I973).
291. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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incrimination have been significantly curtailed since Roe and Miranda,"'
although the cases themselves remain formally the law of the land.
6. Dolan v. City of Tigard (1994)293
Dolan v. City of Tigard was the last regulatory takings case decided
by the Court during Justice Blackmun's tenure. He left the Court at the
close of October Term 1993, soon after Dolan was decided. The Dolan
case was a sequel in many ways to the Nollan case because, like Nollan,
the regulatory takings issue arose in the context of a challenge to a
permit condition rather than, as in a case like Lucas or Agins, a challenge
to the underlying land use restriction itself. In Dolan, the City of Tigard
was conditioning a permit to allow the owner of a plumbing and
hardware store to double the size of the existing store and to expand and
pave the store parking lot. The proposed permit conditions were
designed to address the increased traffic and risk of flooding that would
be caused by such a commercial expansion. The city contended that the
proposed expansion would result in additional traffic from more
customers and increased risk of floods because the related construction
would increase the amount of impermeable surface area and therefore of
runoff. The conditions, accordingly, required dedication of land for (i) a
public greenway along a creek to minimize flooding, and (2) a
bicycle/pedestrian pathway in order to relieve traffic congestion in the
area.294 The Oregon Supreme Court had rejected the takings claims."'
In an opinion written by the Chief Justice, the U.S. Supreme Court
reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court first held that
the permit conditions did not suffer from the same constitutional flaw
present in Nollan because they sought to serve the same legitimate
ends-flood prevention and traffic congestion-furthered by the
underlying development restriction. The Nollan nexus requirement was
therefore met.' The constitutional infirmity, in the Court's opinion,
related instead to whether the degree of exactions being demanded by
the city was "rough[ly] proportional[]" to the projected impact of the
proposed development. 97 The Court ruled that the city had not met its
burden of proof with regard to either of the permit exactions. In
particular, the city had failed to demonstrate why a private as opposed to
a public greenway would not equally satisfy the risk of flood, 98 nor had
the city demonstrated adequately that the proposed bicycle/pedestrian
292. See, e.g., United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2004); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (989).
293. 512 U.S. 374 (994).
294. Id. at 379-83.
295. Id. at 383.
296. Id. at 386-88.
297. Id. at 390-91.
298. Id. at 392-95.
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pathway would rather than merely could address the traffic hazard
problem!"9 Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas joined the
Chief Justice's opinion. Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion, which
Justices Blackmun and Ginsburg joined. Justice Souter also filed a
dissenting opinion.
The oral argument in Dolan was one of Blackmun's last. The
argument was on March 23, 1994, and Blackmun appeared two weeks
later on April 6, 1994, with President Clinton to announce his retirement
at the end of that Term."° Based, however, on Blackmun's oral argument
notes in Dolan, the argument was not one of the more scintillating.
During argument for counsel for the City of Tigard, Blackmun wrote "I
am fighting drowsiness again......
Even though the Chief Justice, and not Scalia, wrote the opinion for
the Court, Blackmun's conference notes show that Scalia here too
pushed the writing in a manner that diminished the majority. At
conference, those voting in favor of the property owner included all
those who ended up in the majority in the final opinion, but the
conference majority also included Justice Souter.02 Just like he had in
Lucas, Justice Souter here too initially voted with the property owner.
And, again, just as in Lucas, Souter left the majority and in Dolan
dissented only after Justice Scalia in effect pushed him away. The only
difference was that it was Scalia's own opinion for the Court in Lucas,
and in Dolan it was the result of Scalia's persuading the Chief Justice to
take a more aggressive stance that lost Souter's vote.
At conference, the Chief Justice first announced his vote to reverse
in favor of the landowner, explaining simply that the City "has to do
[more] than [it did] here" to justify the exactions being imposed,
although a "precise fit is not [necessary]."'" Justice O'Connor indicated
that she "strongly" favored reversal and expressed concern with "what is
going on in the communities!" and asserted that the "[state has the
burden of proof].""3 4 Justice Scalia stated that he was "[with the Chief
Justice]," the "sky [would not] fall" if local government had to justify
these kinds of exactions, and appeared to characterize what the City was
doing here as "a shake-down."3 5 In explaining his vote for reversal,
Justice Thomas discussed how with "Society you have to share [company
299. Id. at 395-96.
300. ARTEMUS WARD, DECIDING TO LEAVE-THE POLITICS OF RETIREMENT FROM THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT 207-09 (2003).
301. Harry A. Blackmun, Oral Argument Notes, Dolan, No. 93-518 (Mar. 23, 1994) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
302. Harry A. Blackmun, Conference Notes, Dolan, No. 93-518 (Mar. 25, 1994) (The Blackmun





THE MEASURE OFA JUSTICE
to be] left alone and have peace."' 6 Finally, Blackmun's notes are
unfortunately limited about what Justice Souter said at conference.
Other than describing the fact that Souter spoke "at length," the
conference notes state only that Souter "wish[ed he] had confidence to
[affirm]. '
The subsequent correspondence between the chambers, however,
makes clear why Justice Souter subsequently shifted positions. On May
12, 1994, the Chief Justice circulated the first draft of his opinion for the
Court. 3°8 In that draft, Rehnquist decided to embrace a constitutional
standard for exactions under the Takings Clause that was less rather than
more demanding. While the state courts were divided concerning
whether the condition must satisfy a "reasonable relationship" or a more
demanding "substantial relationship" test to pass constitutional scrutiny,
Rehnquist decided to adopt the "reasonable relationship" approach
while concluding that the City had not met its burden under that
standard under the facts of this case." The draft opinion expressly
stated: "We hold that a 'reasonable relationship' between the required
dedication and the impact of the proposed development is sufficient for
purposes of the federal Constitution.
310
Justice Scalia responded the next day with a letter to the Chief, with
copies to all chambers, stating that while he "would like to join your
opinion," he also had "several problems. 3 . He expressed concern that
the "reasonabl[e] relat[ionship]" test risked "watering... down" the
"substantially advance" language of Agins.32 He accordingly proposed
that the Chief Justice use a "'rough proportionality' or 'substantial
proportionality"' standard instead because they would have the
"advantage of emphasizing that it is indeed the extent, Draft at io, or
degree, Draft at 12, and not just the nature of the exactions that must pass
muster., 313 Scalia had several other suggestions related to the proposed
proportionality standard. Finally, in addition to requesting that the Chief
Justice eliminate a favorable reference to specific language from a state
court ruling "that I cannot accept," Scalia also asked for either more
discussion or elimination of the draft opinion language that provided that
the "benefit conferred" by the regulatory scheme is relevant to the
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. William H. Rehnquist, ist Draft Majority Opinion, Dolan, No. 93-518 (May 12, 1994) (The
Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
309. Id. at 15-16.
310. Id. at I6.
311. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-518





proportionality analysis." 4 Justice Kennedy, in a follow-up letter to
Rehnquist, generally endorsed Scalia's proposal, while acknowledging
that the case was "difficult," and the need to "speak in somewhat general
terms to allow the law to develop in the series of decisions that no doubt
will arise in the wake of our holding here.
315
Justice Souter, however, wrote a letter expressing his disagreement
with Justices Scalia and Kennedy.' 6 While agreeing with Scalia that "the
opinion should make clear that the nexus required involves a question
both as to nature and as to degree," Souter stated that his own "view is
much closer to the one reflected in your current draft" than to Scalia's
proposal. He continued that he agreed with Chief Justice Rehnquist (and
Justice Stevens) "that the benefit conferred is an important part of [the]
takings analysis" and that he would favor "plac[ing] the burden on the
government entity to show that the burden is not grossly
disproportionate to the burden being added by the proposed action by
the private party as well as to the benefit being conferred on the private
party." Finally, Souter made clear that he could "probably join an
opinion using the 'reasonable relationship' test, but [was] wary of going
any further," and that, as applied to this case, he agreed the public
greenway easement may fail the test, and was willing to remand to
require the City to make a better showing in support of the
bicycle/pedestrian pathway."7
Notwithstanding Justice Souter's concerns, the Chief did agree to
modify his opinion in most of the ways preferred by Scalia. Rehnquist
even agreed to eliminate the "benefit" language although he advised that
"[t]his is an area I know something about from my own private
practice.', 8 Apparently, in response to the Chief Justice's acquiescence
to Scalia's request, which prompted the latter to join the opinion,"9
Souter declined to join the majority and went so far as to write in dissent
instead.3"'
C. SCALIA'S DELIBERATIVE ROLE
The pattern in all of the regulatory takings cases covered by the
Blackmun Papers is generally the same. Once Justice Scalia erased some
initial doubts he appears to have harbored about the proper role of the
314. Id.
315. Letter from Justice Anthony Kennedy to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-
518 (May 16, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
316. Letter from Justice David H. Souter to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan, No. 93-
518 (May 17, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
317. Id.
318. Letter from Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Antonin Scalia, Dolan, No. 93-518
(May I8, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2).
319. Id.
320. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 411-4 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
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Takings Clause, he pushed his colleagues to establish stronger precedent
more protective of property rights and, to that end, he trumpeted bright
line tests rather than balancing and more contextual analysis, as he has
generally done in other areas of constitutional law. Indeed, Scalia pushed
so hard that he frequently pushed away several Justices who might
otherwise have been inclined to join a majority opinion in support of the
takings claim. However, except on one occasion (Keystone Bituminous)
when the upshot may have been a lost opportunity to convert a dissent
into a majority opinion, none of Scalia's pushing appears to have resulted
in a property owner losing in the Court. The result instead was narrow
majorities and sometimes, as in Lucas, opinions that promised far more
than they in fact delivered.
One can, of course, disagree about whether these results make a
Justice more or less effective. Some might, for instance, argue that a
Justice who seeks to promote a specific ideological agenda of any kind
should try to get as much as possible out of every case before the Court.
That may mean pushing as far as possible while keeping the minimum
five vote majority. Under that view, a unanimous or lopsided vote in a
case is, in effect, a wasted opportunity. The author of the opinion should
have taken the opinion even further-as far as possible without losing
the majority-in order to spend strategically the voting capital presented
by the case.
My own view is quite different. First, as an institutional matter, the
Justice who promotes division within the Court to further short term
ideological ends often does the Court and the nation a disservice. To be
sure, dissent can be extremely important, and not all cases need or
should be unanimous. But neither should sharp dissent or narrow
division be an aspiration. There is an incremental cost to the Court, in
terms of the respect in which its rulings are held and the ability of the
Justices to deliberate together in the kind of constructive way necessary
to produce outstanding opinions. The Blackmun Papers make plain the
value of such deliberations because of the enormous intelligence of the
individual Justices and the breadth of experience and perspective they
bring to their work. All nine Justices deliberating respectfully together
produce far better opinions than small camps of chambers within the
Court. Such a deliberative capacity is not inconsistent with respectful and
even sharp dissent. But it can be broken down by efforts from within to
maximize the differences to achieve immediate results or by affirmative
appeals by individual Justices to those outside the Court to condemn the
majority or certain members of the Court in exaggerated terms for their
opposing views. In a letter to Chancellor Kent in 1837, Justice Joseph
Story candidly explored the need for a Justice to strike a balance




While I continue on the Bench I shall on important occasions come out
with my own opinions, for which I alone shall consider myself
responsible. But I shall naturally be silent on many occasions from an
anxious desire not to appear contentious, or dissatisfied, or desirous of
weakening the influence of the Court.32" '
There is also often a strategic disadvantage to the precedent
produced by thin margins or splintered opinions. Even when those
rulings establish binding precedent upon the lower courts, they
frequently represent the kind of ruling that is of limited long term
precedential significance. As in Lucas, compromises necessary to satisfy
a single Justice with enormous leverage on a closely divided Court
ultimately deprive the opinion of any true coherence. Or, also as
epitomized by Lucas, the Justice doing the pushing misses an
opportunity to bring into his fold for the longer term someone who might
prove a long-term ally, but instead becomes a long-term protagonist who
feels no attachment to the ruling announced.
The Blackmun Papers create a strong impression that Justice Scalia
has chosen the more divisive strategy. Whether in writing his own
opinions for the Court or lobbying another Justice charged with that
responsibility, Scalia appears to push hard from within. Nor is he at all
reticent to take another Justice to task for failing to embrace Scalia's
view of legal doctrine. He is a sharp and often barbed critic,322 well
known for producing the kinds of turns of phrases that capture the
attention of the news media and sympathetic commentators outside the
Court. The words he uses seem not so much intended to persuade future
Justices in future cases as to hold up for condemnation, sometimes even
ridicule, his colleagues, by the general public.3 Ironically, those he seems
321. WARD, supra note 300, at 62 (quoting Correspondence from Joseph Story to Chancellor Kent,
June 26, 1837 (brackets omitted)).
322. See generally MARK TUSHNET, A COURT DIVIDED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61-66 (2005).
323. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 6o7 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
The Court thus proclaims itself sole arbiter of our Nation's moral standards-and in the
course of discharging that awesome responsibility purports to take guidance from the views
of foreign courts and legislatures. Because I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth
Amendment, any more than the meaning of other provisions of our Constitution, should be
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded
foreigners, I dissent.
Id.; Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 338 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Seldom has an opinion of this
Court rested so obviously upon nothing but the personal views of its Members."); Wabaunsee County
v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 688-89 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("What secret knowledge, one must
wonder, is breathed into lawyers when they become Justices of this Court, that enables them to discern
that a practice which the text of the Constitution does not clearly proscribe, and which our people
have regarded as constitutional for 200 years, is in fact unconstitutional?"); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("This Court has no business imposing upon all Americans the
resolution favored by the elite class from which the Members of this institution are selected,
pronouncing that "animosity" toward homosexuality, ante, at 634, is evil. I vigorously dissent.");
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to denounce most strongly are those whose votes he needs the most-
members of the Court, such as Justice O'Connor, whose abandonment of
conservative jurisprudence he believes to be the most indefensible."4
At least in the area of regulatory takings, however, there is reason to
believe that Justice Scalia's approach has slowed rather than promoted
the success of the property rights movement since he joined the Court.
As described below, the Court's precedent since Justice Blackmun left
the Court suggests that the state of the law is increasingly less rather than
more favorable to the constitutional claims of property rights advocates.
Justice Scalia's decision not to promote a strategy within the Court of
reaching out to others to create stronger, broader coalitions, has led to a
marked weakening of the precedent that he has trumpeted or created. It
has produced per se rules that reflect his preferred approach but rules
that because of their narrow applicability unwittingly make it harder, not
easier, for property rights advocates to prevail.
III. PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE SUPREME COURT AFTER BLACKMUN:
THE SCALIA BACKLASH
Since Justice Blackmun left the Court in 1994, the Court has ruled in
several regulatory takings case. But rather than demonstrate a steady
expansion or even entrenchment of the Court's rulings favorable to
property rights in Nollan, Lucas, or Dolan, the overall trend has been
just the opposite. The Court's opinions have been generally more
favorable to government regulators, and they have made it more difficult
for property rights advocates to prevail on their constitutional claims. On
those occasions where property rights claims won, moreover, the
precedent that was established was far less expansive than they had
That system is destroyed if the smug assurances of each age are removed from the
democratic process and written into the Constitution. So to counterbalance the Court's
criticism of our ancestors, let me say a word in their praise: They left us free to change. The
same cannot be said of this most illiberal Court, which has embarked on a course of
inscribing one after another of the current preferences of the society (and in some cases
only the counter-majoritarian preferences of the society's law-trained elite) into our Basic
Law. Today it enshrines the notion that no substantial educational value is to be served by
an all-men's military academy-so that the decision by the people of Virginia to maintain
such an institution denies equal protection to women who cannot attend that institution but
can attend others. Since it is entirely clear that the Constitution of the United States-the
old one -takes no sides in this educational debate, I dissent.
Id.; Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 518-19 (x993) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("That is not merely a
waste of research time and ink; it is a false and disruptive lesson in the law."); Schad v. Arizona, 5oi
U.S. 624, 651 (i99I) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Unless we are here to invent a Constitution rather than
enforce one, it is impossible that a practice as old as the common law and still in existence in the vast
majority of States does not provide that process which is 'due."'); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't. of Health, 497
U.S. 261, 293 (i99o) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("that the point at which life becomes 'worthless,' and the
point at which the means necessary to preserve it become 'extraordinary' or 'inappropriate,' are
neither set forth in the Constitution nor known to the nine Justices of this Court any better than they
are known to nine people picked at random from the Kansas City telephone directory").
324. BISKUPIC, supra note 120, at 278-97.
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hoped. By the close of the Court's most recent Term in June 2005, the
Court had either substantially cut back or entirely eliminated both of the
two-prongs of the takings test that Justice Powell established in Agins in
198o and that Justice Scalia had sought to promote and expand into per
se tests in Nollan in 1987 and Lucas in 1992.
A. SUITUM V. TAHOE REGIONAL PLANNING AGENCY (1997)3.5
The Court's ruling in Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in
1997 would seem a clear example of a property rights victory that was a
disappointment. The case, even more than Lucas, presented a factual
backdrop that underscored well the plight of owners of private property
subject to very stringent environmental restrictions on development. The
landowner in the case, Bernadine Suitum, owned property on land
surrounding Lake Tahoe that she and her husband had purchased to
build their "dream home." Land in the Lake Tahoe Basin had been
subject to a series of increasingly stringent land use plans over time as
the Tahoe Regional Planning Agency (TRPA) sought to regulate
development to limit the amount of sediment runoff into the Lake.
Those who built before the development restrictions became more
stringent were able to build homes on parcels of land that would have
been barred under the TRPA plan as finally adopted.36
The Suitums were not able to build before the tougher restrictions
became effective, and under the new land use plan, their parcel was
deemed too susceptible to increased sediment runoff to allow for
residential development. The comprehensive land use plan, however,
provided for so-called "transferable development rights" (TDRs) to
parcels such as the Suitum's, which could be applied to allow for greater
residential development than otherwise permitted on other less
environmentally sensitive parcels in the Tahoe Basin. Under that plan,
the Suitums received some TDRs as a matter of right, based on the
restrictions imposed on their own parcels and others for which they were
eligible to apply. With the TRPA's approval, the Suitums could either
apply the TDRs themselves to other property they owned in the area or
sell them to other property owners seeking to develop eligible property.
Reportedly just before he died, however, Mrs. Suitum's husband insisted
that she not simply sell the property, but instead build the home there
that they had always wanted.
Unable to build, Mrs. Suitum brought a section 1983 regulatory
takings claim in federal court.3"7 The lower courts, however, dismissed
325. 520 U.S. 725 (997).
326. Id. at 728-31; Richard J. Lazarus, Litigating Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency in the
United States Supreme Court, 12 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 179, 184-86 (1997) [hereinafter Lazarus,
Litigating Suitum].
327. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 728-31.
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her claim for lack of ripeness. The trial court ruled that it could not
assess the extent to which the land use restrictions had interfered with
Mrs. Suitum's property rights until she had applied for and sought to sell
her TDRs. Only then could the value of the TDRs be known and,
therefore, the economic impact of the development restrictions be
assessed. The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the ground that until Suitum had
applied to transfer her TDRs, there had been no "final decision" in the
application of the regulations to her property, as required for a ripe
takings claim.328
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, ruling that Suitum's
takings claim was clearly ripe.3"9 She did not have to apply for or
otherwise seek to obtain or sell TDRs to bring her takings claim. But the
opinion for the Court, written by Justice Souter, provided a far less
significant win for property rights advocates than they had hoped. First,
the Court reaffirmed the validity of the "final decision" ripeness
requirement that several amici supporting Suitum had sought to use the
case to narrow.330 Second, while ruling that Suitum's suit was not barred
by ripeness, the Court did so on narrow, case specific grounds. The Court
held nothing more than that the TDR application was not a necessary
part of a final decision when, as in Suitum, it was undisputed that the
TRPA had finally determined that Suitum's parcel was in a zone in which
development would not be permitted. She need not do anything more to
establish a record of decision establishing the value of any TDRs to
which she might be entitled under the plan.33'
Even more significantly, the Court declined to reach the potentially
much more important second question presented in the case, which was
the relevancy of the value of the TDRs to Suitum's takings claim.33
Relying on language in Penn Central, the TRPA argued that the value
was relevant to the threshold question whether the land use restriction
amounted to a taking. For that reason, the TRPA further argued that the
value of the TDRs took the case out of the Lucas per se rule, because
they showed that she had not been deprived of all "economically viable
use" of her property.333 Suitum's response was that because the TDRs did
not amount to a "use" of her property, Lucas clearly applied, and that
the value of the TDRs was relevant only to the question whether she had
received "just compensation" for the taking of her property.334
328. Id. at 731-33; Lazarus, Litigating Suitum, supra note 326, at 182-84; see also Suitum v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 8o F.3 d 359 (9th Cir. 1996).
329. 520 U.S. at 744.
330. Id. at 735-41.
331. Id. at 742-45.
332. Id. at 728.
333. Lazarus, Litigating Suitun, supra note 326, at 199-201.
334- Id. at 195-99.
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This second issue was far more significant than the ripeness
"finality" issue because of its portent for the reach of Lucas and the use
of techniques such as TDRs.335 Souter's opinion for the Court declined to
reach the issue at all, which environmentalists and government regulators
considered very good news. Justice Scalia, in a separate concurring
opinion, joined by Justices O'Connor and Thomas, faulted the majority
for failing to reach the TDR issue by 6assuming that their value was
relevant to the threshold taking issue.33 His separate concurrence also
took explicit account of the potential relevance of the TDR valuation
issue to property rights claims: "taking [TDRs] into account in
determining whether a taking has occurred will render much of our
regulatory takings jurisprudence a nullity." '337
For that same reason, however, it is all the more striking that Souter,
and not Scalia, had the opinion assignment in the case. The most likely
scenario is that the Chief Justice, as the senior Justice in the majority,
assigned the opinion to Souter in the first instance.338 To be sure, many
factors go into opinion assignments, especially ensuring rough equity in
numbers of Court opinions between Chambers, but the difference
between a Souter assignment and a Scalia assignment was potentially
quite huge. Souter, after all, had strongly disagreed with Scalia in both
Lucas and Dolan, so much so that he ended up not joining the majority
opinions in either case. The clear implication of the opinion assignment
was that Souter would write the kind of narrow opinion that Scalia would
disfavor, which is exactly what Souter did.
If given the opinion assignment, Scalia might well have been able to
draft an opinion favorable to property rights advocates on the second
TDR issue, but it would undoubtedly have been a sharply divided Court.
Because Scalia's concurring opinion in Suitum garnered three votes
(including his own) and Rehnquist's dissent in Penn Central strongly
suggests his agreement with Scalia on the irrelevancy of TDR value to
the threshold taking issue,339 Scalia would presumably have needed to
sway only one more Justice, most likely Kennedy. The Chief Justice
decided against giving Scalia that opportunity. Rehnquist might have
done so for many reasons, including the possibility that there was in fact
335. Id. at 200-01.
336. Suitum, 520 U.S. at 745-50.
337- Id. at 750.
338. Of course, it is alternatively possible, in theory, that Scalia had the initial opinion assignment,
but lost his Court for the broader ruling, and was relegated to a concurring opinion. Such an
alternative scenario seems extremely unlikely. Neither the structure of the majority and concurring
opinions nor the amount of time between argument and decision suggests that there was a change in
authorship.
339. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 150-52 (1978) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
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another case about which Scalia strongly preferred to write." Whatever
the reason, the result was a case that ultimately did very little to promote
the property rights agenda.
B. PALAZZOLO v. RHODE ISLAND (2001)"
Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, decided by the Court in 2001, was
another regulatory takings case won by the landowner, but the Court's
opinion portended a possible unraveling of the precedent that Scalia had
established in favor of property rights in Lucas. At issue in Palazzolo
was whether a landowner who purchased property after development
restrictions were effective could subsequently bring a meritorious
regulatory takings challenge against those same regulations.34 The
Rhode Island Supreme Court had ruled that the takings claim must fail."3
The court ruled, first, the takings suit was not ripe because the landowner
had not received a "final decision" regarding how the property could be
used.3" In light of its threshold ruling on ripeness, the state court could
have ended its opinion there, but the court went on to explain that the
landowner had no right to challenge as takings the application of
regulations that became effective prior to his legal ownership of the
property in question. 5 According to the court, that fact alone would
defeat even a Lucas claim based on total economic deprivation because
the land use restrictions being applied would constitute "background
principles" of law under the Lucas exception to its own per se rule. 46 The
court also added that the factual premise of Palazzolo's Lucas per se
taking claim, in all events, lacked merit because its use was contradicted
by undisputed evidence that he had $200,000 in development value
remaining on an upland parcel of the property."7 Finally, the state
supreme court elaborated that Palazzolo was further precluded from
making a meritorious claim under Penn Central, for reasons analogous to
why a Lucas claim would lack merit under the "background principles"
340. Scalia's opinion assignment that month was instead to author the opinion for the Court in a
case raising the question whether Congress had authorized the Secretary of Transportation to appoint
civilian members of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals, and if so, whether this authorization
is constitutional under the Appointments Clause of Article II. Edmonds v. United States, 520 U.S. 65 1
(1987). The Court was unanimous, except that Souter declined to join part of the Court opinion, and
filed a separate concurrence. Id. at 666. Faculty colleagues commenting upon an earlier draft of this
Article, and more familiar with the Appointments Clause issue at stake in Edmonds, believe that
Scalia may well have harbored significant interest in writing the Edmonds opinion because it provided
him with an opportunity to limit the Court's prior opinion in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988),
from which he dissented (id. at 697). See Edmonds, 520 U.S. at 661-65.
341. 533 U.S. 6o6 (2001).
342. Id. at 611.
343. Palazzolo v. State, 746 A.2d 707 (R.I. 2ooo).
344. Id. at 712-15.





exception to the per se rule-because he became the lawful owner of the
land after the land use restrictions became effective, he could have had
no "reasonable investment-backed expectations" that were adversely
affected by this regulation."'8
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion by Justice Kennedy
that, like Suitum, rejected once again the government's threshold
ripeness argument. 9 But the landowner's victory included in it a lot of
longer term bad news for the property rights movement. First, the Court
held that the landowner's Lucas challenge in all events lacked merit
because there was clearly some economic value to at least one part of his
property.350 The Court declined the opportunity, urged by the landowner
and numerous supporting amici briefs, to conclude that the Lucas per se
test was triggered to the extent that any part of the property was subject
to a complete prohibition on development."' Second, Kennedy's opinion
for the majority stopped short of embracing the landowner's argument
that the existence of development restrictions at the time of purchase was
wholly irrelevant to the takings inquiry. The majority concluded only
that the state supreme court was wrong in saying that their existence
automatically precluded a takings claim.35'
Even more portentously, Justice O'Connor both joined the majority
opinion and wrote separately to make clear her view that the existence of
development restrictions at the time of purchase most certainly would be
relevant to takings analysis under Penn Central. "[T]he regulatory regime
in place at the time the claimant acquires the property at issue helps to
shape the reasonableness of those expectations." '353 Because it was
already fairly clear that Justice Kennedy thought the same based on his
concurring opinion in Lucas, O'Connor's opinion left no doubt that a
solid majority of at least six Justices were ready to jettison Lucas as a
leading case for takings analysis.354 Instead, Justice Brennan's opinion for
348. Id. at 717.
349. Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 6o6 (2001).
350. The Court nonetheless did remand the case back to the lower courts for further proceedings
to allow the landowner to argue that the development restrictions amounted to a taking under the
Penn Central balancing test. Id. at 632. The state trial court recently ruled that the landowner's claim
lacked any merit under Penn Central, relying primarily on the absence of landowner reasonable
investment backed expectations to develop the property in light of its physical characteristics
(approximately one-half was below mean high water) and public nuisance law. See Palazzolo v. State,
No. WM 88-o297, 2005 WL 1645974, at "I (R.I. Super. July 5, 2005).
351. Petitioner's Brief on the Merits at 38-41, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 6o6 (No. 99-2047); Brief of the
Institute for Justice as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 26-29, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 6o6 (No.
99-2047); Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Farm Bureau Federation and Rhode Island Farm
Bureau in Support of Petitioner at T3-15, Palazzolo, 533 U.S. 606 (No. 99-2047).
352. Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 626-30.
353. ld. at 633.
354. The dissenting (and partially concurring) opinions filed and/or joined by Stevens, Souter,
Ginsburg, and Breyer, make clear their view that pre-existing laws are relevant to, and tend to defeat,
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the Court in Penn Central, long resisted by Scalia, seemed destined to
become, as Justice O'Connor now proclaimed, the "polestar" for the
Court in takings cases.355
Justice Scalia also wrote separately in Palazzolo, but now for the
purpose of taking deliberate and harsh aim at O'Connor, who ten years
earlier had supplied him with one of his five votes in Lucas. Scalia
minced no words in his challenge: "I write separately to make clear that
my understanding of how the issues discussed in Part II-B of the Court's
opinion must be considered on remand is not Justice O'Connor's." ' 6 But,
what was becoming clear in light of Palazzolo was that Scalia had not
just parted ways with O'Connor, he had lost the Court that he had once
had in Nollan, Lucas, and to a certain extent in Dolan.
C. TAHOE-SIERRA PRESERVATION COUNCIL V. TAHOE REGIONAL
PLANNING AGENCY (2002)...
In Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency, Justice Stevens took full advantage of the table laid for him by
Justice Scalia and turned it over. Stevens, who had been essentially
relegated to a series of dissents, including in Lucas, took back the Court,
and Scalia found himself in dissent with little left of his opinion for the
Court in Lucas.
The sole issue in Tahoe-Sierra was whether a complete ban on
development during a thirty-two month moratorium for the purpose of
developing a comprehensive land use plan amounted to a per se Lucas
taking of property in the absence of "just compensation." The taking
claimed would, akin to the kind of taking described by the Court in First
English, be a temporary taking limited to the time that the development
moratorium was in effect. The landowners' legal arguments essentially
sought to marry the best parts from their perspective of First English, in
terms of temporary takings, with Lucas, in terms of a per se analysis.
The Supreme Court, however, rejected the argument in a sweeping
opinion written by Justice Stevens for the Court, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Neither Kennedy
nor O'Connor wrote separately. No doubt to achieve just that end, the
Stevens Court opinion borrows generously from the prior writings of
both O'Connor and Kennedy, with numerous verbatim quotations. The
upshot is an opinion that dramatically limits the reach of Lucas and, akin
to Kennedy's "reasonable expectations" analysis in Lucas and
takings claims by undermining the possible reasonableness of a landowner's development
expectations. See id. at 637-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part); id. at 645-55
(Ginsburg, J., joined by Souter and Breyer, J.J., dissenting); id. at 654-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
355. Id. at 633.
356. Id. at 636.
357. 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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O'Connor's balancing analysis in Palazzolo, completely rebuffs Scalia's
basic per se approach to takings law:
Our jurisprudence involving condemnations and physical takings is as
old as the Republic and, for the most part, involves the straightforward
application of per se rules. Our regulatory takings jurisprudence, in
contrast, is of more recent vintage and is characterized by "essentially
ad hoc, factual inquiries," .. . designed to allow "careful examination
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances.""' 5
The Tahoe-Sierra case also appeared to put to rest Scalia's attempt,
commenced in Lucas,359 to have the Court revisit the Penn Central ruling
that takings analysis must consider the "parcel as a whole ' ' 36, and not just
focus on the part of a landowner's property that is most burdened by
regulation. As the Court acknowledged in Lucas,36' the significance of the
Lucas per se test is ultimately entirely dependent on how one defines the
subject property. If one focuses just on the part of the property that is
most burdened or just on a time period when the property is most
burdened, one is more likely to find that there is a complete economic
deprivation. But, if one looks to the parcel as a whole physically and/or
temporally, one will rarely ever find such an economic wipeout. Such
blanket, permanent prohibitions almost never happen. In Tahoe-Sierra,
the Court ruled that one must look to the parcel as a whole both spatially
and temporally."2 Under that approach, there will almost never be the
permanent elimination of all economic value necessary to trigger Lucas.
Finally, the Tahoe-Sierra majority likewise rejected the efforts of
property rights advocates to expand the reach of the Lucas per se takings
test by not having its application strictly tied to complete wipeouts of al
economic value. Stevens' opinion for the Court made plain that the
Lucas "holding was limited to 'the extraordinary circumstance when no
productive or economically beneficial use of land is permitted."' 6" The
categorical rule does "not apply if the diminution in value [is] 95%
instead of ioo%. ' '6 Hence, "[a]nything less than a 'complete elimination
of value,' or a 'total loss,' the Court acknowledged, would require the
kind of analysis applied in Penn Central."
6
,
358. 535 U.S. at 325 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in Tahoe-Sierra
quotes or cites specifically to opinions authored by Justices O'Connor and Kennedy six and three
times, respectively.
359. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, io6 n.7 (I992).
360. Penn Cent. Trans. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 130 (1978).
361. Lucas, 505 U.S. at toi6 n.7.
362. 535 U.S. at 331-32 ("An interest in real property is defined by the metes and bounds that
describe its geographic dimensions and the term of years that describes the temporal aspect of the
owner's interest. See Restatement of Property §§ 7-9 (r936). Both dimensions must be considered if
the interest is to be viewed in its entirety.").
363. Id. at 333 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1017).
364. Id. at 333 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at IO9 n.8).
365. Id. at 333 (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at I019-2o n.8).
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In sum, Tahoe-Sierra represented a major repudiation of what had
been widely perceived as Justice Scalia's single greatest achievement on
behalf of the property rights movement: his opinion for the Court in
Lucas converting Justice Powell's reference in Agins to "economic
viability" and creating a per se takings test. But what proved Lucas's
undoing was the opinion's lack of internal coherence and careful
craftsmanship and Scalia's failure in Lucas and in subsequent cases to
build alliances with other members of the Court. After Tahoe-Sierra,
Lucas was largely relegated to its peculiar facts: a complete economic
wipeout with no remaining economic value.366 Because, moreover, hardly
anyone believed those presumed facts to be true even in Lucas itself-
because of the value such beachfront property inevitably has to
neighboring landowners seeking to increase the lot size for their own
pre-existing homes-its precedential reach became almost a nullity.?6
D. LINGLE V. CHEVRON U.S.A. INC. (2005)368
Just this past Term, the Court followed up on Tahoe-Sierra with yet
another sweeping rule that cut back yet again on the property rights
movement's prior gains before the Court. While Scalia had based Lucas
on the second "economic viability" prong of the takings test announced
by the Court in Agins,369 he had used the first prong of Agins to justify the
heightened means-ends analysis he had established for the Court in
Nollan and had pushed the Chief Justice to adopt for the Court in
Dolan.37 ° The first Agins prong stated that a land use regulation amounts
to an unconstitutional taking if it fails to "substantially advance a
366. The "background principles" caveat has, moreover, increasingly been transformed into a
powerful categorical defense to takings claims. See Blumm & Ritchie, supra note 289, at 321.
367. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1033-34 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
The South Carolina Court of Common Pleas found that petitioner's real property has been
rendered valueless by the State's regulation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. The finding appears
to presume that the property has no significant market value or resale potential. This is a
curious finding, and I share the reservations of some of my colleagues about a finding that a
beachfront lot loses all value because of a development restriction.
Id. (citations omitted). One of the more interesting documents in the Blackmun Papers relates to the
question whether the landowner David Lucas had really been deprived of all economic value in his
property as a result of the restrictions on development imposed on his two parcels. In a memorandum
to the Justice written by one of Justice Blackmun's clerks in anticipation of the oral argument in the
case, the clerk noted: "There is something fishy about this case." Clerk Memorandum to Justice Harry
A. Blackmun, Lucas, No. 91-453 (Feb. 28, 1992) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2). The clerk
strongly intimated that the very high prices that David Lucas reportedly paid for the property, prior to
the restrictions, reflected the property's actual market value. She suspected that the reported increases
in appreciation prior to his purchase were "too much to be believed," but were more likely the result
of "speculative churning to raise the price," and, because Lucas was intimately involved in the real
estate development in the area, "[i]t also seems very odd that someone who was in on the island's
development from the start would wait to buy the last lots at the highest prices." Id.
368. 544 U.S. 528 (2oo5).
369. Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (I980).
370. See supra text accompanying notes 311-15.
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legitimate governmental goal."37 ' Scalia had invoked the "substantially
advance" test in his opinion for the Court in Nollan to justify the ruling
that the nexus requirement application to permit condition exactions was
more stringent than mere rational basis review typically invoked in due
process or equal protection challenges to economic legislation.372 He did
so again in Dolan in his letter to Chief Justice Rehnquist, which
successfully persuaded him to require more than a "reasonable
relationship" between the degree of exactions being demanded by the
City and the projected impact of the proposed development that justified
governmental regulation in the first instance.373 The Ninth Circuit had,
following Justice Scalia's lead, embraced the property rights movement's
even more far reaching argument that the Takings Clause demanded a
heightened means-end analysis for all governmental restrictions on
private property, wholly outside the context of permit exactions. 74
In Lingle, however, the Court in an opinion written by Justice
O'Connor unanimously rejected the "substantially advance" language
that it had, also unanimously, endorsed in Agins. The Court was candid
in acknowledging its prior error: "On occasion, a would-be doctrinal rule
or test finds its way into our case law through simple repetition of a
phrase-however fortuitously coined." '375 But the Court also made clear,
in no uncertain terms that the "'substantially advances'.., prescribes an
inquiry in the nature of a due process, not a takings, test, and that it has




Even the care that the Lingle Court took to make clear that it was
not disturbing either Nollan or Dolan will likely have just the opposite
effect.377 The Court's assertion that its "decision should not be read to
disturb these precedents" was on a narrow reading of both cases."8 As
described by the Court, "the rule [Nollan and Dolan] established is
entirely distinct from the 'substantially advance' test we address today"
because "Nollan and Dolan both involved dedications of property so
onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be deemed per se
physical takings." '379 The irony of the Court's preservation of Nollan and
371. Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
372. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 835 n.3 (1987).
373. Letter from Justice Antonin Scalia to Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Dolan. No. 93-5 18
(May 13, 1994) (The Blackmun Papers, supra note 2) ("Elsewhere, however, Nollan pointed out that
even in the context of general regulation (never mind individuated exaction) land-use restriction must
'substantially advance legitimate state interests,' quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260
(i98o) (emphasis added) .... ).
374. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d IO3O (9th Cir. 2000).
375. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 125 S. Ct. 2074, 2077 (2005).
376. Id. at 2082-83.
377. Id. at 2086-87.
378. Id. at 2087.
379. Id. at 2086-87.
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Dolan is that the property rights movement had hoped to take the Nollan
and Dolan rationale for heightened means-end analysis and persuade
courts to apply it far beyond the narrow confines of "dedications of
property so onerous that, outside the exactions context, they would be
deemed per se physical takings." They sought to apply them not only to
all permit exactions, but also to police power regulations of property with
or without exactions, as in Lingle.
Coming full circle, Scalia, too, joined with all the other Justices to
produce a unanimous Court for its repudiation of Agins. The Blackmun
Papers suggest that Scalia had initially recognized that much of what was
being dubbed a takings issue was really a question of due process."8 But,
after expressing those concerns at conference soon after joining the
Court, he later abandoned them in favor of promoting an aggressive
reading of the Takings Clause. In Lingle, he appears to have abandoned
that particular battleground in the takings revolution. Or, as he himself
put it at oral argument in Lingle, the entire Court, including Scalia, was
going to "have to eat crow." ''
E. SAN REMO HOTEL V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO (2005)382
The regulatory takings case decided by the Supreme Court after
Lingle is far from the most important, but it strongly suggests that the
property rights movement may, at long last, be ridding itself of a
procedural obstacle to the maintenance of regulatory takings claims.
Even then, the potential for a later win was embedded in a case that
property rights advocates lost unanimously in the Court.
The precise legal issue raised in San Remo Hotel v. City and County
of San Francisco was not exactly a barn burner: whether an exception to
issue preclusion should exist under the Full Faith and Credit Clause for
issues decided in regulatory takings cases that had to be brought first in
state court because of the Supreme Court's ripeness ruling in Williamson
County.8 In Williamson County, the Court held in an opinion for the
Court written by Justice Blackmun that a plaintiff could not maintain a
section 1983 claim in federal court for a regulatory taking without first
pursuing any available state court avenues available for just
compensation. 8 ' The Court's logic in Williamson County was
straightforward. Unless and until a property owner has been denied just
compensation potentially available for a regulatory taking in any
available state administrative or judicial proceeding, there has been no
380. See supra text accompanying note 241.
381. Official Oral Argument Transcript at 2i, Lingle, 544 U.S. 528, No. 04-163 (Feb. 22, 2005).
382. 125 S. Ct. 2491 (2005).
383. Id. at 2495.
384. 473 U.S. 172 (1985).
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violation of the federal Constitution's Takings Clause. 858 That Clause,
after all, does not prohibit takings per se; it prohibits takings absent the
payment of "just compensation."
The practical effect of the Court's procedural ruiing, however, has
been harsh on property owners bringing takings challenges who would
prefer to maintain their lawsuit to vindicate a federal constitutional right
in federal court.386 If they maintain their federal constitutional claim first
in state court to satisfy Williamson County ripeness requirements, they
are precluded from relitigating the same claim in federal court. 3"' And, if
they instead seek formally to reserve their federal claim, by bringing only
a state constitutional takings claim in state court, federal courts
subsequently hearing their federal constitutional claim may decide to
reject their federal claim pursuant to issue preclusion and the Full Faith
and Credit Clause. Issue preclusion can still apply so long as the federal
and state constitutional takings claims are effectively commensurate.
Under issue preclusion, when there is no grounds for believing that the
state constitutional takings issue is any different than a federally based
one, a state court's rejection of a state constitutional regulatory takings
claim compels a federal court's similar rejection of a federal takings
claim."8
In San Remo, the Court had little trouble unanimously concluding
that, notwithstanding any possible unfairness caused by denying property
owners a federal forum for their federal constitutional claim, the
circumstances did not warrant the Court's making an exception for
regulatory takings claim under the Full Faith and Credit Clause.38
Property rights advocates, however, can find some solace in the
concurring opinion filed in the case by the Chief Justice, joined by
Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Thomas.3" Rehnquist's concurring
opinion stated that the Court should reconsider the correctness of the
Court's holding in Williamson County that plaintiffs must first seek just
compensation in available state administrative and judicial fora.
Rehnquist stated that "further reflection and experience lead me to think
385. Id. at 194-97.
386. See San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, Kennedy,
and Thomas, JJ.).
387. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394,401 (1981).
388. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 104 (I98O).
389. San Remo had the additional complication that the plaintiffs had initially brought the case in
state court and formally reserved the federal takings claim pursuant to England v. Louisiana Board of
Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964). See San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2501-02. The Court, however,
found the England reservation ineffective because the plaintiffs in state court had not confined their
litigation to "antecedent state law issues" but instead broadened it by putting forward facial and as-
applied takings claims that, in effect, asked the state court to resolve the same federal issue nominally
reserved in federal court. Id. at 2503.
390. San Remo, 125 S. Ct. at 2507 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring, joined by O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas, JJ.).
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that the justifications for [the Williamson County] state-litigation
requirement are suspect, while its impact on takings plaintiffs is
dramatic. '""' It was only because the question whether Williamson
County should be overruled in any respect was not before the Court in
San Remo - because the parties had not raised it - that the Court did not
reach the issue. Given the identity of those signing onto the Chief
Justice's concurring opinion, the possibility seems high of the Court's
taking the next step to overrule the Williamson County state-litigation
ripeness requirement in a future case where the issue is raised. For
reasons unknown, Justice Scalia did not join the Chief Justice's opinion,
but it seems unlikely that he would not be sympathetic to the Chief
Justice's views. Now that Chief Justice Roberts has replaced Rehnquist,
and Justice Alito has replaced Justice O'Connor, the precise status of
Williamson County is necessarily more murky again.
CONCLUSION
Since Justice Scalia joined the Supreme Court in fall 1986, the
Court's docket has reflected a concerted effort to establish legal
precedent favoring landowners bringing regulatory takings challenges.
The Court has decided a large number of significant regulatory takings
cases and in almost every case but Lingle at the request of the property
owner who had lost in the court below.392 Notwithstanding the
opportunity thereby presented, the resulting precedent has plainly been a
disappointment to property rights advocates. The Court's analytic
framework for regulatory takings analysis remains today, just as it was in
1978, Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court in Penn Central. Justice
Scalia's effort has largely failed to persuade his colleagues on the Court
to eschew balancing in favor of a per se approach or heightened means-
end analysis. His first major opinion favoring property rights, Nollan,
along with the Court's related decision in Dolan, have largely been
confined to the narrow world of permit exactions of dedications of
permanent physical easements. So too has Justice Scalia's once landmark
property rights victory in Lucas largely been whittled away. Almost
twenty years after Scalia joined the Court, it is now 85-year-old Justice
Stevens in the majority, while Scalia is mostly relegated to the dissent.
To the extent, moreover, that takings law has perceptibly shifted
since the Court's 1978 Penn Central ruling, it has arguably become more
and not less difficult for regulatory takings plaintiffs to prevail. Once
courts conclude that Lucas does not apply-either because there is no
total economic deprivation or, increasingly, because of the existence of
391. Id. at 2509-10.
392. The only other case granted at the request of the government defendant was City of Monterey
v. Del Monte Dunes, 526 U.S. 687 (I999).
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background principles-they have proven unlikely to find a taking
instead under the Penn Central framework. The inapplicability of Lucas,
in effect, saps the force of most takings claims. What Scalia hoped to
serve as a per se takings rule proves, in its practical operation, to work
more often as a per se no takings rule. Even Penn Central today is
potentially less friendly to plaintiffs than when first announced by Justice
Brennan for the Court in 1978. In light of the Court's recent precedent,
especially Tahoe-Sierra and Lingle, and opinions of individual Justices
such as Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Palazzolo and Justice
Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lucas, it seems to have become harder
for takings plaintiffs to prevail under the reasonable expectations
analysis carved out by the Court in Penn Central.393
What the Blackmun Papers add to the story is how Justice Scalia
may have appeared an effective champion of pro-property rights rhetoric
to those outside the Court, but how much less effective he has been so
far within the Court in furthering that agenda. He not only repeatedly
failed in his efforts to build a workable coalition on the Court, but he
also pushed away potential allies. The upshot was, in the first instance,
precedent heavy on strong rhetoric yet light on staying power. The
ultimate result was a splintering of those Justices, which included more
than a simple majority intuitively sympathetic to property rights claims
and the reconstruction of a new majority more often led by the once
iconoclastic Justice Stevens.
To be sure, this Article's thesis is not that Justice Scalia, standing
alone, caused the faltering of the property rights movement that has
occurred within the Supreme Court during the past several decades. Of
course, he did not. There were other forces that played significant, and
likely even more significant, roles than Scalia himself. Circumstances far
beyond the control of any individual Justice create the facts of the cases
that are before the Court and therefore the merits of arguments for and
against protection of private property rights. So too does the quality of
the advocacy and the reasoning of the lower court opinions plainly make
a big difference to the outcome in the Court.
Yet, the Justices themselves, especially their ability to work within
the Court, clearly matter too. The general public as well as legal
commentators typically limit their measure of a Justice on the Court to
the formal votes he or she publicly declares when the Court announces
its decision in specific cases. Some of the most important work of a
Justice, however, is the work each does behind the scenes with other
members of the Court. It is in private discussions-in individual
chambers, between chambers, and at conference attended exclusively by
393. See, e.g., K&K Constr., Inc. v. Mich. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 707 N.w.2d 365 (Mich. Ct. App.
2005) (rejecting takings claim challenging denial of permit to develop in a wetland).
[VOL. 57:759
March 20o6] THE MEASURE OFA JUSTICE 825
the Justices themselves-when and where a Justice's influence on the
outcome is truly determined.
A Justice's formal vote is, of course, significant, but it is not
ultimately the measure of greatness of a Supreme Court Justice. All
Justices, including the Chief Justice, have only one vote. To be a great
Justice requires more than the ability to vote, no matter how intelligent
those votes. It depends on a Justice's ability to discuss and debate legal
issues with the other Justices on the Court in a constructive fashion and
to be persuasive in both oral presentation and written word within the
Court. By this measure, Justice Scalia has been a disappointment for the
property rights movement.
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